Commercial, Military

Boeing 757 Testing Shows Airplanes Vulnerable to Hacking, DHS Says

By Calvin Biesecker | November 8, 2017
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security headquarters. Photo courtesy of DHS

A team of government, industry and academic officials successfully demonstrated that a commercial aircraft could be remotely hacked in a non-laboratory setting last year, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official said Wednesday at the 2017 CyberSat Summit in Tysons Corner, Virginia.

“We got the airplane on Sept. 19, 2016. Two days later, I was successful in accomplishing a remote, non-cooperative, penetration,” said Robert Hickey, aviation program manager within the Cyber Security Division of the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate.

“[Which] means I didn’t have anybody touching the airplane, I didn’t have an insider threat. I stood off using typical stuff that could get through security and we were able to establish a presence on the systems of the aircraft.” Hickey said the details of the hack and the work his team are doing are classified, but said they accessed the aircraft’s systems through radio frequency communications, adding that, based on the RF configuration of most aircraft, “you can come to grips pretty quickly where we went” on the aircraft.

The aircraft that DHS is using for its tests is a legacy Boeing 757 commercial plane purchased by the S&T branch. After his speech at the CyberSat Summit, Hickey told Avionics sister publication Defense Daily that the testing is with the aircraft on the ground at the airport in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The initial response from experts was, “’We’ve known that for years,’” and, “It’s not a big deal,” Hickey said.

But in March 2017, at a technical exchange meeting, he said seven airline pilot captains from American Airlines and Delta Air Lines in the room had no clue.

“All seven of them broke their jaw hitting the table when they said, ‘You guys have known about this for years and haven’t bothered to let us know because we depend on this stuff to be absolutely the bible,'” Hickey said.

Hickey, who is a staff officer in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on assignment to DHS S&T, said that while aviation is a subsector of the transportation component of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the focus is squarely on traditional terrestrial-based systems. The reservation and scheduling systems of airline aren’t part of Hickey’s research, he said.

“I want to suggest to you that there’s a different type of critical infrastructure, and that’s critical infrastructure that’s in motion, of which aviation is one of the third of that,” Hickey said. The others are surface and maritime transportation, he said.

“And I look at all of those and say, ‘If we’re not looking at those from a different perspective, we’re going to miss the boat,’ no pun intended,” Hickey said. He said he doesn’t know the answers yet for aircraft cyber infrastructure, adding that it’s not a policy issue yet because more research needs to be done on these systems to understand what the issues are. Patching avionics subsystem on every aircraft when a vulnerability is discovered is cost prohibitive, Hickey said.

The cost to change one line of code on a piece of avionics equipment is $1 million, and it takes a year to implement. For Southwest Airlines, whose fleet is based on Boeing’s 737, it would “bankrupt” them if a cyber vulnerability was specific to systems on board 737s, he said, adding that other airlines that fly 737s would also see their earnings hurt. Hickey said newer models of 737s and other aircraft, like Boeing’s 787 and the Airbus Group A350, have been designed with security in mind, but that legacy aircraft, which make up more than 90% of the commercial planes in the sky, don’t have these protections.

Aircraft also represent different challenges for cybersecurity and traditional land-based networks, Hickey said. He said that whether it’s the U.S. Air Force or the commercial sector, there are no maintenance crews that can deal with ferreting out cyber threats aboard an aircraft.

“They don’t exist in the maintenance world,” Hickey said, noting that when he was in the Air Force, he commanded a logistics group. Hickey was also an airline pilot for more than 20 years. The chief information officers of airlines “don’t know how to chase a cyber spark through an airplane either,” Hickey said. “Why? Because they have been dealing with, and they’re programmed to, and they do a great job of, protecting the terrestrial-based networks. Airplanes are absolutely different — crazy different.”

Trying to deal with airplane cybersecurity the same way it is approached for land-based networks “is going to leave us short of the mark,” Hickey said.

Hickey's team for his work includes Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Energy Department's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, University of California San Diego, Sierra Nevada, SRI International and QED Secure Solutions. QED is led by Johnathan Butts, a former Air Force officer who has done cyber vulnerability assessments of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and B-52 bombers, Hickey said.

Two years ago, a security researcher claimed to have hacked into a passenger aircraft through its in-flight entertainment system while he was traveling aboard the plane. However, there is no evidence he accessed flight control systems.

This article was originally published by Defense Daily, an Avionics sister publication. It has been edited.

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  • Bardi

    Yeah, let us start with an aircraft that first came out in 1983. $ 1 million for each aircraft or for a fleet?Changing “one line of code” is relatively inexpensive as each vulnerable piece of avionics is cycled through on regular mx.

    The aircraft itself is a versatile joy to fly.

  • CommonSense

    There is a high noise to signal ratio in this article.

    The only RF delivered on the 1983 757 would be ACARS, so that would be the entry point.

    Now if it was modified by someone else to have WiFi or other communications on it, then you are talking about a poorly implemented modification.

    As far as the SWA 737 goes, the Classics are mostly retired, the NextGens may have WiFi but they were added after the factory without connecting to the cockpit. The Max’s are hopefully secure by design right from the factory. If Boeing isn’t doing the right thing in their design, then they ought to be liable, not SWA.

  • Freeflight

    The way this reads, it sounds like the “fix” for this is gonna be to ban electronics from being taken aboard by passengers, like they’ve already tried before.

  • Is anything here new since ?

  • Paulc

    Yeah lot of open ended statements and partial quotes makes this a hard one to parse… Like what the heck is a “cyber spark”? Quick use of Google turns up corporate names, but nothing from hacking… sigh.

  • fieldmcconnell

    This was reported to FAA, FBI and Northwest Airlines on 10 December 2006. It was also the motive behind Civil Case 1:08-1600 (RMC) which chronicled how 9/11 had been made possible by the BUAP which is the subject of a youTube titled BOEING UNINTERRUPTIBLE AUTOPILOT. The FAA and FBI and most significantly ALPA ( airline pilots association….pilot union) are all accessories after the fact to wrongful death in 4 9/11 jets and 15 others since including Air France 447 and MH370

  • “we were able to establish a presence on the systems of the aircraft”

    What systems? The entertainment systems? I’ve read it twice and I don’t see anything specific.

  • davidshiel

    No really, read the Dead American, the best explanation to date!