While Air Force F-35A and Navy F-35C fighters by Lockheed Martin were in the U.S. strike package against Venezuela on Jan. 3, a December Pentagon Inspector General (IG) report highlighted continuing readiness shortfalls for the aircraft.
The F-35 is the U.S. military’s costliest acquisition program–more than $2 trillion over the fighter’s life, of which $442 billion is for acquisition and $1.58 trillion is for sustainment.
The average availability “for all military service F-35 aircraft in FY 2024 was 50 percent, which means the aircraft was not available to fly 50 percent of the time,” the study said. “This is 17 percent lower than the average minimum performance requirement.”
“F-35 squadrons are also cannibalizing parts to keep aircraft flying instead of being able to rely on receiving parts from Lockheed Martin’s supply chain,” the report said. “F-35 squadron
officials indicated that they cannibalized parts from other aircraft because of part shortages or supply chain issues with Lockheed Martin. For example, the 388th Maintenance Group at Hill Air Force Base [Utah] cannibalized parts from five F-35A aircraft, and the 34th Fighter Generation Squadron at Hill Air Force Base cannibalized parts from nine F-35A aircraft to keep the remaining aircraft mission capable. In another example, Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore [California] Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 125 cannibalized a total of 89 parts from different F-35C aircraft from November 2024 through February 2025.”
The IG report focused on the nearly $1.6 billion air vehicle sustainment (AVS) contract the Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin in June 2024, and a resulting $3.4 billion undefinitized contract action (UCA) finalized last August after the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin were unable to agree on certain contract terms, including incentive fees, profit, and the performance incentive structure.
“The June 2024 AVS contract did not provide Lockheed Martin a financial incentive or a disincentive related to meeting the aircraft readiness performance requirements, and the F-35 AVS 2024 UCA did not include any incentive metrics because the F-35 JPO and Lockheed Martin did not agree on the specific incentive metrics to be included,” according to the IG. “In addition, the August 2025 AVS definitization modification did not include incentive metrics to meet all aircraft readiness performance requirements.”
The study said that, in the case of the NAS Lemoore cannibalizations, removing the F-35 performance based arrangement (PBA) aircraft readiness performance requirements “limited the F-35 JPO’s ability to take any action against Lockheed Martin when aircraft did not meet mission requirements or when the squadrons were forced to cannibalize parts to enable aircraft to deploy.”
“The DoD did not adequately oversee Lockheed Martin’s performance and did not always hold Lockheed Martin accountable for poor AVS performance,” the IG said. “This occurred because the F-35 JPO did not include aircraft readiness performance or other measurable contract requirements and did not enforce material inspection and government property reporting requirements in the June 2024 AVS contract.”
Unless there is a waiver, F-35 sustainment contracts are to include PBAs that delineate performance requirements for the three fighter variants.
“The F-35 JPO included these performance requirements as incentive metrics on F-35 AVS contracts prior to June 2024,” the IG said. “However, the F-35 JPO did not include any of these performance requirements as contract requirements or incentive metrics on the June 2024 AVS contract or the F-35 AVS 2024 UCA. For example, the F-35 JPO did not include the Navy’s FY 2024 air vehicle availability threshold (minimum) performance requirement for its deployed F-35 aircraft, which was 70 percent, while its objective (goal) was 90 percent. Additionally, military service officials confirmed that they did not waive the aircraft readiness performance requirements identified in the bilateral agreement.”
The IG also said that program oversight was lacking. Of 16 F-35 bases, five did not have contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) appointed by the F-35 JPO, according to the report.
“The F-35 JPO did not require CORs to monitor performance requirements or negative trends,” the IG said. “The Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan [QASP] requires CORs to accomplish contract surveillance by evaluating and documenting Lockheed Martin’s performance and negative trends. However, 23 (96 percent) of the 24 CORs stated that they did not provide oversight on performance requirements or incentive metrics. Additionally, 22 (92 percent) of the 24 CORs stated that they did not track cannibalization rates.”
“The F-35 JPO paid Lockheed Martin $3.89 million in incentive fees for the June 2024 AVS contract without input from most CORs,” according to the study. “In addition, part shortages or issues with Lockheed Martin’s supply chain are negative trends that the CORs should be documenting. The Program Executive Officer for the F-35 JPO should align the COR responsibilities to monitor and report impactful evaluation data on Lockheed Martin’s performance, including the impact of cannibalization of spare parts on aircraft readiness and update these responsibilities in the QASP.”
A version of this story originally appeared in affiliate publication Defense Daily.