Owing to the complexity of events surrounding Eclipse Aviation and the Eclipse 500, Aviation Today’s VLJ Report will devote most of this week’s issue to last week’s unfolding story beginning with this analysis of the House hearings.

More criticism was heaped on the Federal Aviation Administration last week as the House Transportation and Infrastructure Aviation Subcommittee held hearings into the rush to certify the first very light jet, the Eclipse 500.

The hearing, with testimony peppered with references to FAA management actions that were “highly unusual” and “rare,” included testimony from Department of Transportation Inspector General Calvin Scovel indicating FAA test pilots said it was premature to grant a type certificate. It also outlined how FAA management overruled the certification directorate employees, seemingly at the behest of a new, untried manufacturer in order to grant a type certificate by the end of the fiscal year. Indeed, said Scovel, the decision to issue the type certificate is “difficult to defend or explain.”

Even so, no one at the hearing, including the National Transportation Safety Board, said the Eclipse 500 was an unsafe aircraft. Instead the hearing was about whether the processes leading up to the aircraft’s type certificate and the company’s production certificate were appropriate, and, according to Scovel, they were not.

While FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Nick Sabatini and John Hickey, who heads FAA’s aircraft certification directorate, defended the agency, there seemed to be little substance except they will learn from this experience and do better in the future. “I believe raising the conflicts or questions to headquarters was the appropriate and right thing to do,” said Sabatini, of the oft-repeated contention that whenever Eclipse did not like certificate office rulings or requests, it complained to senior FAA management. He noted the agency was criticized earlier this year when what were allegedly cozy relationships between local FAAers and American and Southwest were not raised to management. Related Story
Sabatini recounted the problems with the aircraft that arose during certification. These included aircraft flaps, stall warnings, screens blanking out, and most significantly, how and whether the avionics should have been approved. FAA pilots complained of too frequent stall warning as well as the blanking of the screens of the Electronic Flight Information System (EFIS). However, he noted other screens were available to give the pilot the information needed for safe flight.
“Finally, and perhaps most importantly, were the allegations that a portion of the aircraft’s avionics system was certified to less than the applicable standards,” he said, adding it was this that prompted the reassignment of certificate office personnel off the Eclipse certification projects and the interjection of Director of the Aircraft Certification Service John Hickey. He also said “the company suffered an overall lack of awareness of aircraft production best practices.”
The Special Certification Review Team (SCRT), formed on the recommendation of the NTSB, chalked up the problem to communications issues while Eclipse testified that much of what was said at the hearing was full of mistakes and misperceptions. (See related stories Eclipse Statement & Fact Sheet and Eclipse Certification Review Yields Recommendations in this issue.) It must be noted that SCRTs are extremely rare and previous SCRTs were prompted by fatal accidents with the ATR-72 and MU-2 icing issues and the Boeing 737 rudder problem – all very high profile events.

A Troubling Process
The picture emerging from last week’s hearing is unsettling, not only because it showed a manufacturer seemingly in control of the process with the cooperation of FAA management, but it revealed a troubled manufacturer that may have violated federal aviation regulations, falsified documents and failed to take the corrective actions ordered by the FAA. At the very least, the IG report and testimonies of certification employees will give liability attorneys a field day should there be a fatal accident.

Certification employees were concerned about the personnel turnover at the manufacturer. “During this program the FAA dealt with at least four different ‘chiefs’ of flight test or similarly titled persons,” said David Downey, who was manager of the Rotocraft Directorate responsible for certification of products from Southwest-based companies like Eclipse, but who has since left the agency to become vice president-flight safety for Bell Helicopter-Textron.

Downey said the doubt by directorate personnel was prompted by Eclipse actions and set the stage for contentious relations. “EAC had, over the previous years, established a legacy of not meeting its commitments to the FAA,” said Downey. “EAC rarely submitted a report on time, yet had the gall to drop a report on the FAA and want approval immediately. Further, this was a company that wanted to gain its engineering approval – aka TC, its production approval or PC, its Repair Station Certificate and have aircraft awarded their Standard Airworthiness Certification all within 15 days.”

He also reported the discomfort of Eclipse employees. “As one company test pilot shared with me, his integrity test light had been pushed way too many times,” he continued. “The quality system at Eclipse was in disarray. The personnel turnover, lack of personnel, pressures to have airplanes ready to sell post-TC award kept the company in a state of constant change. It was apparent to FAA personnel that Organizational Design Airworthiness Representatives (ODAR) personnel were being harassed and hassled for trying to meet the FAA standards.”

Indeed, in what Scovel said was a highly unusual move, Eclipse was the only VLJ manufacturer to receive ODAR authorization before the aircraft was approved. “It would have been difficult for them to have the expertise necessary to do that job prior to certification,” he said.

Raburn’s Sudden Departure
The hearing certainly casts new light on the sudden departure of Eclipse Founder Vern Raburn. At the very least, testimony characterizes Eclipse as putting both type and production certification ahead of quality and safety controls, which could erode its customer confidence. Indeed, Eclipse’s pronouncements of how it brought the Eclipse 500 to market in record time takes on a whole new meaning.

In his New York Times report, aviation reporter Matt Wald indicated that Raburn suggested FAA did not have the expertise to certify such a new technology aircraft, something echoed by Peg Billson, president and general manager of the manufacturing division in her testimony. “…Raburn said his company had clashed with the FAA staff because the technology was ‘pushing the envelope’ for small planes, and the FAA staff members in charge of such planes had little experience with advanced electronics or new assembly techniques,” he wrote. “Sometimes the FAA staff members handling the certification would tell him, ‘I don’t like it because I don’t understand it.’”

That could be read two ways, however – either the FAA, which certifies sophisticated aircraft systems all the time, is incompetent or there was something wrong at Eclipse, and, judging from testimony, it sounds as if both are true.

Certainly, listening to Dennis Wallace gives one pause that Eclipse knew how software certification was done. FAA concerns centered on avionics software that the inspector general said should have been resolved before certification and was now leading to numerous incidents with the aircraft.

It was Wallace’s testimony that provided a chilling look at the process and puts into question Sabatini’s testimony. Wallace said that the FAA management, instead of questioning Eclipse, questioned RTCA DO-178B. This is a traditionally and universally accepted means to secure FAA approval for digital computer software and is applicable to all Systems & Equipment onboard the aircraft, said Wallace. FAA’s Washington managers said that RTCA DO-178B standards were not part of Federal Aviation Regulations, suggesting they could be ignored.

“I was told by the AIR-1 manager, in what I perceived to be a very direct, animated, and threatening manner, that my position on this constituted ‘antiquated thinking’ and that I best ‘start thinking outside the box,’” said Wallace, an FAA Software Technical Specialist with the certifying office. “He further stated that we were here to ‘save a company.’ That was when I realized two things: 1) The supplier was not the problem – I was perceived by management to be the problem – because I wasn’t going to accept the software since it had not been shown to be compliant to the applicable safety regulations, and 2) The bus had already left the station and, not only was I not on the bus, I felt I was being thrown under it.”


A Lengthy Process
A process that should have taken three years, took five, according to testimony. While FAA holds this up as indicating additional scrutiny, inspectors suggest Eclipse just didn’t know what it was doing. Judging from the number of aircraft presented as ready for certification by FAA designees at Eclipse which failed FAA’s inspection with numerous serious failures and non-compliance issues, they make a good case; a case buoyed by the number of service difficulty reports and incidents and accidents requiring investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board.

It was the ODAR failure to catch compliance problems that prompted the certification office to question whether Eclipse had falsified documents and violated FARs. “The FAA’s inspection of the airplane indicated that Eclipse neglected to adequately inspect the airplane before making application for an airworthiness certificate, and thus possibly violated FAA regulations by making an apparent false statement on the FAA forms,” said Ford Lauer III, manager of the FAA Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO) in San Antonio, who was so concerned about what was happening in the certification process that he took out personal liability insurance. “It was determined that an investigation should be initiated for a possible violation of federal regulations.”

Thomas Haueter, director of the NTSB’s Office of Aviation Safety, reported the Board has conducted five investigations involving Eclipse 500 airplanes since service entry early last year. One occurring three years ago, while the other four have occurred since April. The investigations are still ongoing. He recounted the incidents including an incident over Midway in which the engine throttle controls failed. Related Story www.aviationtoday.com/vlj/categories/bga/25347.html

IG Scovel reported that in Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) between June 2007 and July 2008, the largest user – DayJet – submitted 84 SDRs for 28 Eclipse aircraft. “While SDRs are to be expected with any new aircraft, the fact that many of those reported for the EA-500 appear to relate back to design issues [raised prior to certification] is troubling,” he said. “As a result of [the Midway] incident, FAA engineers re-examined the software that controls the engines and discovered software logic flaws that should have been resolved before design certification.” Haueter reiterated NSTB concerns, saying the board was surprised throttle issue was not found by certification pilots.

Billson, who said the manufacturer was never asked for its input in the IG’s report but hopes to discuss its perceptions of the certification process with the IG and clarify the record, characterized the SDRs filed by DayJet – 93 of the 94 filed to date as “overabundance of caution and a certain amount of inexperience with the SDR process in an effort to build robust communications with its FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO).” She indicated an Eclipse investigation into the SDRs revealed only one meets the requirements of an SDR.

“To date, 59 of the 94 SDRs have been recommended for closure to the FAA,” she said. As for the incident at Midway that set the FAA’s special certification review team in motion, she said, “Two teams of experienced engineers at Pratt & Whitney Canada and Eclipse Aviation — plus two certifying agencies: The FAA and Transport Canada — missed this requirement flaw,” she said, adding Eclipse delivered more than 250 aircraft and is climbing passed 32,000 total fleet hours, including more than 5,000 flight test hours.

Despite Billson’s protestations, evidence of post-TC problems came quickly. Indeed, it took three months after the September 2006 type certification, to resolve issues with the first production aircraft before an airworthiness certificate was issued and it could be delivered to the first customer. Even then, Maryetta Broyles, Technical Program Management Specialist, Aircraft Certification Service, was surprised the certificate was issued given the number of outstanding items on the aircraft left on the aircraft only 10 days earlier.

Wallace testified he was equally surprised to find a type certificate had been issued to Eclipse on Saturday, September 30, despite numerous software issues that remained outstanding the previous day.

Lots of Squawks
Scovel reported that FAA’s quality control reviews, which began in July 2006, identified numerous deficiencies, with 42 serious deficiencies (including four involving software) identified as late as February 2007. “First, the Production Certification Board found that Eclipse had not completed the requirement to show that it had established and could maintain a quality control system,” he said. “Second, the Board found significant issues associated with Eclipse’s controls over its suppliers. Despite the impact that these issues could have on the production process, FAA awarded the production certification to Eclipse with 13 specific production problems.

Eleven Eclipse aircraft were delivered prior to the issuance of the Eclipse production certificate and even after the aircraft gained its type certificate it took another three months before an aircraft was ready for delivery.

Eclipse was to have maintained control of these aircraft until they came into compliance. However, Scovel found the company not only did not retain control but delivered them with deficiencies. He said the use of IOUs is not uncommon pointing to Boeing and Sino Swearingen as examples of FAA allowing companies to offer IOUs on action items – as it did with Eclipse. However, unlike Eclipse, Boeing’s and Sino Swearingen’s were for non-safety issues on the aircraft. “It certainly calls into question using this practice with such a new manufacturer,” he said.

“Additionally, before it received its production certification, Eclipse encountered numerous problems replicating its own aircraft design on the factory floor,” he continued. “A significant concern was that manufacturing deficiencies were not identified by Eclipse inspectors designated to certify aircraft airworthiness. For example, in one instance, Eclipse presented an aircraft to FAA for airworthiness certification with approximately 20 airworthiness deficiencies, even though an FAA-approved Eclipse inspector had previously inspected the aircraft for airworthiness and found no non-conformities.”

The IG investigation was prompted by allegations that senior FAA officials prevented FAA inspectors from properly inspecting the production of the Eclipse jet by, among other things, reassigning the inspectors who had identified numerous deficiencies with the aircraft’s production and prohibiting the new inspection team from looking under the aircraft floorboards during final inspection. These reports were followed by other FAA personnel coming forward who raised additional concerns that senior officials in FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service short-cut both the design and production certification processes.

“The complaints alleged that those officials may have compromised safety by (1) certifying Eclipse’s design despite knowledge of Eclipse’s failure to meet certification requirements for avionics software, stall warnings, flaps, and cockpit screens,” said Scovel, “and (2) rushing approvals required for Eclipse to mass produce its jet. A significant issue overshadowing FAA’s certification of the EA-500 is the inherent risks associated with a new aircraft utilizing new technology, produced by a new manufacturer.”

The process of certificating a new, advanced small jet, said the IG, did not easily fit into FAA’s existing certification framework. Indeed, FAA itself found that general aviation certification requirements were inadequate, prompting them to propose the development of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to clarify certification requirements for VLJs on which the agency is now working.

The IG indicated that allowing Eclipse to use alternate means of compliance to meet design certification requirements despite unresolved design problems identified during testing may have contributed to problems that are still reported by Eclipse users today.

MIDO Concerns
Scovel noted that, with such new technology aircraft from an inexperienced manufacturer, FAA should have taken pains to ensure all was in order before granting certification to the aircraft and a production certificate to the manufacturer. Instead, he reported that the FAA was overly accommodating to a rookie manufacturer.

He contends the FAA was in a rush to meet its own performance plan, calling for a VLJ certification by the end of Fiscal 2006. In addition, Downey testified that Eclipse was under a financial gun to gain certification. “What many of us were unaware of was the contractual obligations to creditors that EAC had agreed to,” he said. “Among these was that financial backing was contingent on gaining the FAA airplane Type Certificate within 30 days of Pratt & Whitney getting the FAA TC for their engine. Also, there were stock options/employee benefits tied to meeting dates.”

Broyles testified that, during the production certificate certification process, Eclipse failed to take corrective action any number of times. In addition, after local inspection teams were removed and a headquarters team was put in place she was told at a closed FAA-only meeting that since Eclipse had been audited so many times, her final inspection for a production certificate should go “no more than an inch deep,” a phrase repeated, to her surprise, by her Eclipse escort who complained she was going “more than an inch deep” when her findings related to the horizontal stabilizer led to questions that required further investigation..

“When we arrived at Eclipse, corrective actions for the previous District Office audit were not presented to us and had not been implemented,” she said. “Since the corrective actions were not in place, we began our evaluation of the Functional Tests. The procedures were failing the review. The tests were written incorrectly, documentation was incomplete, and were not passing the specification requirements as documented. Once we determined the tests were not in compliance, the team leader switched the focus of the team to continue with the ongoing preliminary District Office audit. During this audit 20 additional non-compliances were identified.”

Conclusion
The discomfort with what happened with Eclipse should worry everyone. No matter who is right or wrong, the process was a shambles and only resulted in cross recriminations between the manufacturer, the certification and FAA managers that is unhealthy in the extreme. It certainly does nothing to retain the confidence in either the FAA or the manufacturer. One thing is clear, however, we will hear more on this if the lawyers have anything to do with it.