Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A300, A310, and A300-600. Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A300 and A310 series airplanes. That AD currently requires replacement of the nose landing gear drag strut upper attachment pin. This new AD requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) to require additional life limits and/or replacements for certain main landing gear and nose landing gear components, and also expands the applicability. This AD results from revisions to the ALS of the ICA to include new or more restrictive life limits and/or replacements. We are issuing this AD to ensure the continued structural integrity of these airplanes. This AD becomes effective October 27, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A310-203, -204, -221, -222, -304, -322, -324, and -325. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: DGAC [Direction G�n�rale de l'Aviation Civile] France issued AD F-2005-078 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2006-02-06] to require the modification (Airbus modification 13023), defined in Airbus SB [service bulletin] A310-53-2124, to increase the service life of junctions of center box upper frame bases to upper fuselage arches. This structural modification falls within the scope of the work related to the extension of the service life of A310 aircraft and widespread fatigue damage evaluations. The threshold timescales for accomplishment of the tasks as defined in SB A310-53-2124 were refined and reduced. The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking of the frame foot run- outs, which could lead to rupture of the frame foot and cracking in adjacent frames and skin, and which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. This AD becomes effective October 14, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 Series Airplanes and Model A340-200 and -300. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An A340 operator has reported an uncommanded engine N degrees4 shut down during taxi after landing. The root cause of this event has been identified as failure of the fuel pump Non Return Valve (NRV) preventing the collector cell jet pump from working. This led to engine N degrees4 collector cell fuel level to drop below the pump inlet and consequently causing engine N degrees4 flame out. Multiple NRV failures in combination with failure modes trapping fuel could potentially increase the quantity of unusable fuel on aircraft possibly leading to fuel starvation which could result in engine in-flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. This AD becomes effective October 14, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler servo control, associated with surface deflection in flight and hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N) MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken. Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was due to pressure pulse fatigue. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage). In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected, which constitutes an unsafe condition. Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. This AD becomes effective October 14, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A300 B2-1C, B2-203, B2K-3C, B4-103, B4-203, and B4-2C. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An operator has reported the loss of a centre flap inner tab on an in-service A300 aircraft. The centre flap inner tab detached during approach to an airport. A similar event was reported several years ago on a pre-mod 04770 aircraft. Investigations led by the manufacturer revealed that the centre hinge bracket developed a fatigue crack causing complete failure of the bracket. The tab rotated causing failure of the inboard link followed by the failure of the outboard link. Detachment of a centre flap inner tab could be a potential risk to persons on the ground We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. This AD becomes effective October 14, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900 and 900ER. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires repetitive testing of the rudder pedal forces or repetitive detailed inspections of the inner spring of the rudder feel and centering unit, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires replacement of the spring assembly in the rudder feel and centering unit, which terminates the repetitive tests or inspections. This AD results from reports of low rudder pedal forces that were caused by a broken inner spring in the rudder feel and centering unit; a broken inner spring in conjunction with a broken outer spring would significantly reduce rudder pedal forces. We are issuing this AD to prevent reduced rudder pedal forces, which could result in increased potential for pilot-induced oscillations and reduce the ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane. This AD is effective October 14, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; British Aerospace Regional Aircraft Model HP.137 Jetstream Mk.1, Jetstream Series 200 and 3101, and Jetstream Model 3201. Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that will supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: BAE Systems have been notified by the main landing gear (MLG) radius rod manufacturer, APPH Ltd, that a batch of incorrectly manufactured Buffer Springs (part number 184818) has been supplied to their parts distributor and maintenance and repair organisation (MRO) facilities in North America. There is a risk that any radius rod fitted with one of these incorrectly manufactured Buffer Springs could jam in an unlocked position. This condition, if not corrected, could result in MLG collapse and consequent injury to occupants of the aeroplane. EASA issued AD 2009-0121-E to require the replacement of the affected radius rods. BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 32-A-JA090640 Revision 2 (the ASB) has now been issued, which identifies an additional seven affected radius rods by serial number (s/n). This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. This AD becomes effective October 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727-281 Equipped With Auxiliary Fuel Tanks Installed in Accordance With Supplemental Type Certificate SA3449NM. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires deactivation of Rogerson Aircraft auxiliary fuel tanks. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, which identified potential unsafe conditions but has not provided associated corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD is effective October 26, 2009.