Regarding the Aug. 14 Helios B737 crash, Akrivos Tsolakis, the head of the Greek Investigating Commission of Air Accidents and Incidents, said recently, "We know where we are going [in the investigation] and I can say that we will know where we will end."

If so, the investigation may focus on the following:

1. Warning horns.
2. Positioning of pressurization and air conditioning gauges and switches in the overhead panels (out of the pilot's monitoring scan capabilities).
3. Checklists (self challenge and reply having been largely discredited as just a reading - and thus prone to error, particularly in the after-takeoff check of the pressurization and air conditioning controls). The 10,000-foot check should also include a physical numerical readout of cabin altitude, differential and cabin rate-of-climb.
4. Cockpit emergency access (also a Helios responsibility as it would appear that cabin crew didn't have the cockpit access codes).
5. Oxygen line-valve positioning determination (is it ON/is it OFF? Hard to tell with a rotary valve).
6. Larger issues.
   1. Do we need a dead man's handle for automated aircraft? (Some cockpits already have "pilot awake?" alarms that require a button to be pressed every so often - particularly for long-haul). A so-called dead man's handle would preclude a flight management computer (FMC) programmed climb to a protracted cruise at high altitude with an incapacitated crew.
   2. Do we need a regulation that says that crews must level off at a minimum safe altitude (or at least no higher than 14,000 feet) when a system irregularity is encountered in the climb?
   3. Do we need to pay more attention to the ability to initiate and comprehend conversational English used in troubleshooting (evidence here that confusion existed cross- cockpit and between cockpit and the ground technician)? Some cockpit crews are capable of only bare minimal technical English terminology in their communications and radio transmissions.
   4. Are regulations needed saying that all cockpit switches and circuit breakers must be left in standard positions following maintenance or tagged, flagged and annotated in aircraft documentation?
   5. Air traffic control (ATC) needs to ensure positive communications are established on hand-off at flight information region (FIR) boundaries. In other words, no more phantom jets.
   6. Cabin crew need basic indoctrination on how to dial up a frequency, squawk Mayday and communicate using a cockpit mike and headset. That covers pilot incapacitation (food- poisoning/terrorism/depressurization/smoke/poisoning/birdstrike/missile strike, etc.). It may be that the cabin crew need the capability to initiate a Mayday squawk (via a coded entry into a touchpad for instance), and/or a direct communications link capability via a cell-phone, perhaps.
   7. What is the constitution of simulator syllabus sorties covering pressurization failures and common crew and maintenance errors?