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Monday, March 17, 2003

Airports Surveyed for Terrorist Missile Launch Locations

Officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Transportation Security Administration have begun visits to airports to assess where terrorist might attack airliners with surface-to-air missiles. Takeoff is considered the most vulnerable time, since the airliner is heavily loaded with fuel and the engines are pumping out the most heat at takeoff thrust - the proverbial moth to a flame for a heat-seeking missile.

According to press accounts, site surveys have been conducted at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport (ORD) and at Virginia's Norfolk International Airport (ORF). Secluded areas along approach and departure routes are receiving particular attention as potential launch locations. Persons found loitering can expect to be questioned by law enforcement officers likely to be conducting more frequent patrols of these areas.

The site surveys are part of a generalized concern that lost or black-market missiles could find their way into the hands of terrorists. Legislation was introduced Feb. 5 to equip airliners with countermeasures (see ASW, March 3).

A week after that legislation was announced, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report outlining some of the many challenges involved in equipping airliners to defeat missiles. The issue is a good deal more complex than retrofitting airliners with countermeasures.

The CRS report provides additional details of the threat:

  • On Nov. 6, 2002, three men with links to al Qaeda tried to buy Stinger missiles from FBI agents in Hong Kong. It has been reported separately that the three men, extradited to San Diego, have pled not guilty to charges of plotting to sell the missiles to al Qaeda. U.S. undercover agents videotaped negotiations in which men discussed swapping the missiles for a half-ton of heroin and five tons of hashish.
  • A RAND report estimates that as many as 40 civilian airliners have been shot down by man-portable missiles, inflicting 760 deaths.
  • About 400 Stinger missiles provided to Afghan rebels in the 1980s remain unaccounted for (see ASW, Jan. 11, 1999, for a more complete history of missile attacks against airliners).

Of interest, portable surface-to-air missiles may not be the only threat. Sources suggest that a heavier missile like the radar-guided SAM-6 (comparable to the U.S. Hawk system) could have successfully downed the Israeli charter jet attacked unsuccessfully by lightweight SA-7 missiles last November. Indeed, the missile might be modified to feature a passive electronic seeker. However, the use of such a heavier weapon would require crews highly-trained in its use, which of necessity would involve technical support from one or more host nations who have acquired this Soviet-built system. The use of such a weapon would instantly point to such "state sponsored" training, and the likelihood of U.S. retaliation.

Issues Involved in Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles Avionics integration, flying techniques, public perceptions all affected
Item
Challenge
Cost Infrared countermeasures would cost between $1 million and $3 million to acquire and install.
Perception The presence of missile countermeasures may promote perceptions that flying is not safe.
Problems of use. Flares and transmitters known as IRCMs create fields of IR (infrared) energy to confuse missile. Flares can be dispensed preemptively during takeoff. Use of flares may be difficult because of environmental considerations (ground fires). IRCMs cannot be used preemptively. The cockpit crew must be aware that a missile has been launched, relying on a missile approach and warning system (MAWS) for that function.
IR paint. Reduces aircraft's IR reflectivity and visual profile, making aircraft more difficult for terrorists to see and thus averting a missile launch. Cost and maintainability of the paint unknown. It may be lighter than conventional aircraft paint and appears to offer few complications for airline application compared to other countermeasures.
Hardening aircraft structure against missile explosions. Programs to date have focused on hardening airliners to better withstand internal bomb blasts. IR guidance systems seek hot engine exhaust; hardening of surrounding wing structure likely infeasible.
Evasive maneuvering. Likely not effective and presents significant risks. Without MAWS, flight crew would not know of a missile launch. Would require additional pilot training and transport-category aircraft are not maneuverable enough to evade a shoulder-fired missile.
Reducing engine power to minimum for sustained flight if missile launch is detected. Unknown effectiveness and heightened safety risks.
Altered air traffic patterns to minimize time aircraft are vulnerable to missile launches and to make flight patterns less predictable. Spiral descents would limit approach and descent patterns to a smaller perimeter around the airport but would require extensive restructuring of airspace and procedures. Could increase controller workload and require pilots to make turning maneuvers at low altitude. Could reduce passenger confidence in flight safety. Technique would not mitigate risk to departing aircraft, considered the most vulnerable to missile attacks.
Varying approach and departure patterns. Aviation radio frequencies are not protected, and terrorists could gather intelligence regarding changing flight patterns.
Increased use of night flights and minimal use of aircraft lighting. Less passenger demand for night flights. Turning off aircraft lights raises safety concerns for collision avoidance.
Employ ground-based countermeasures at high-risk locations, such as randomly dispersing flares in vicinity of airport. Flares pose risk of fires on the ground and may diminish public confidence in the safety and security of air travel.
Source: Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, Feb. 12, 2003, Report No. RL31741
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