AEA Challenges SMS NPRM

The Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA) has submitted comments to the Federal Aviation Administration in response to the FAA's safety management systems proposed rulemaking (Safety Management System; Docket No. FAA-2009-0671).

The AEA does not support the FAA's broad-based proposal to mandate an independent safety management system for maintenance organizations. The AEA believes the SMS proposal is "an excessive, unwarranted and unjustified administrative burden."

The AEA supports aviation safety, and believes the proposal makes sense for the airlines; however, while the regulations could benefit from some of the elements of SMS, the proposal does not make sense for single-tiered companies," the group added.

AEA believes collecting data on safety management systems is unrealistic until the agency further defines the intended scope of the program. "Based on the FAA's previous history, the administrative burden on maintaining an independent program is indefinable and excessive. An integrated approach to upgrade the current regulations to include the elements of SMS is the only manageable approach," it added.

Furthermore, the FAA has not clearly defined the hazard SMS is intended to address, but rather defines SMS to address "unknown" hazards. This mandate is not within the scope of current rulemaking practices, AEA wrote the FAA.

"Similar to its current management of manuals and programs repair stations must maintain, the FAA is incapable of estimating any reasonable amount of administrative burden of developing, approving and managing an independent SMS program," the trade group feels.

The AEA represents more than 1,300 aviation businesses worldwide, including repair stations specializing in maintenance, repair and installation of avionics and electronic systems in general aviation aircraft. AEA members also includes manufacturers of avionics equipment and airframe makers.

AEA commented, in part:

The Aircraft Electronics Association does not support the FAA's proposal to mandate an independent safety management system for maintenance organizations.

Notwithstanding the Association's support of the FAA's efforts to enhance aviation safety, the AEA does not support the broad-based approach of safety management systems as proposed by the FAA in the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.

The technical elements of risk identification, management and mitigation all are appropriate within the bounds of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations; that is, as a quality management system to ensure compliance with the Federal Aviation Regulations.

The unbound mandate for hazard evaluation, risk identification and risk mitigation without a cited hazard is outside the scope of the Administrative Procedures Act; therefore, the proposal is unsubstantiated. In addition, because the FAA has failed to identify a specific hazard it is attempting to mitigate, it is impossible to determine if any of the discussions of an SMS program as a viable solution are proper and adequate.

There are so many different SMS programs being implemented today in every sector of aviation that herding these different approaches into a cohesive process could be completely impossible.

The FAA's use of SMS cost-and-benefit economic data in the ANPRM without defining the program is inappropriate.

An operator's SMS program may or may not be consistent with the FAA's intended rulemaking. At this time, the only consistency is the name "safety management system." There is no consistency in the performance, elements or outcome of the programs. This proposal is not reasonable.

Does SMS make sense for airlines? Yes.

The fractured regulatory structure of our aviation regulations allows for divided corporate leadership, which both insulates the senior leadership and allows one division of a company to make decisions that could impact other departments without any mandate for corporate oversight. EASA is correcting this by proposing a complete redesign of the aviation regulations so there is a single certificate for a multi-faceted company. Under EASA's proposal, a single certificate could cover everything from flight training and air operations to maintenance and manufacturing. In the United States, Canada, and Australia, which uses the legacy regulatory structure, the civil aviation authorities' only option is to create this overarching "umbrella" requirement to bring each of the certificates under the same management level.

Does a regulatory SMS make sense for a single-tiered company? Absolutely not. However, the regulations could benefit from some of the elements of SMS.

Should SMS be a standalone process for a maintenance organization? No.

The unbound proposal of risk analysis of any and all publically available identifiable hazards regardless of source would place an unreasonable administrative burden on aviation businesses. Currently, the FAA evaluates and analyzes identifiable hazards, and, if appropriate, develops mitigation strategies. The proposal to delegate the single FAA evaluation, analysis and mitigation to 4,000 individual repair stations multiplies the administrative burden of evaluation, analyses and mitigation by 4,000.