No Proof That It Will Make Security Better

Given that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will implement new procedures Dec. 22 (immediately prior to the Christmas Holiday), how effective will they be from a risk-management perspective? That is the question raised by Andrew Thomas, author of Aviation Insecurity (see ASW, Feb. 17, 2003). He makes the following points:

What problems do these new measures solve?

They take the focus off screeners looking for innocuous items and, instead, on things that might cause greater harm to the aviation system.

How well do the new measures solve the problem?

Report after report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and DHS reveals that checkpoint screener performance remains at about the same level as it was on the morning of 9/11. These new measures will NOT improve the quality of security checkpoints nor enhance the ability of screeners to detect more harmful items.

What other problems does this security measure cause?

A greater risk of in-cabin injury at the hands of disruptive passengers who now have more access to danger-causing items [e.g., scissors]. This is further exacerbated by inconsistent flight attendant training programs.

Are these new measures worth the costs?

There is no proof that this will make aviation security any better. In fact, the in-cabin environment will now face a higher threat level from disruptive passengers, although passengers are now willing to involve themselves in the security process much more so than in the past. Customer service will be slightly improved. In short, this is much ado about nothing. Regarding the shooting of a deranged passenger in Miami last week, Thomas said, "A real fear is that the incident in Miami - although justified within existing parameters - may lead to situations where Federal Air Marshals [FAMs] feel the need to involve themselves more and more during in-cabin situations. If so, this would fly in the face of the FAM program, which is to guard the cockpit door ... As the scope and magnitude of air rage incidents rise, flight attendant training continues to come up short, and the December 22 changes which will allow once prohibited items on board are implemented, two questions arise: (1) What NEW training will the FAMs undertake to manage the new threat levels within the cabin, and (2) Where will the FAMs draw the line between acting and not acting? Accountability is key in all of this." >> Thomas, e-mail: Andrew@aviationinsecurity.com <<