More On Missiles

Man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) pose a long-term threat to the airline industry, for which a long-term commitment to interdict and defeat is necessary, sources say. Clearly, the large aircraft infrared countermeasure (LAIRCM) proposed by Northrop Grumman, is one means of defense should terrorists succeed in getting a missile or missiles like the SA-18 "Needle" into firing position (see ASW, Aug. 18).

Here are some other items to fold into the discussion:

The joint inquiry: The December 2002 report of the intelligence community failings leading to the 9/11 attacks mentions the MANPADS threat twice. Other findings in this report show intelligence community breakdowns in "connecting the dots" that made it possible for the terrorists to succeed (see ASW, Aug. 18).

On page 214 - in which the deputy director of the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acknowledged that the agency "had not performed strategic analysis on airplanes as weapons before September 11" - this individual, not named in the report, went on to say:

"We have a couple of approaches to strategic analysis in CTC now ... We have spent a fair amount of analytic time looking at intelligence reporting that [al-Qa'ida] is going to use a particular type of tactic or go after a particular type of target, other intelligence reporting [showing] that they have actually trained at that tactic or trained for that type of target ... When you get all three of those ingredients, that's pretty sobering. What is most alarming to us is the number of tactics that we've gotten that kind of a case on, that three-legged case ... on surface-to-air missiles ... use of truck bombs and car bombs ... the use of aircraft, both aircraft hijacking and aircraft as weapons ... the use of improvised explosive devices like Mr. Reid put in his shoes several months ago ... Put it all together and you can say that al-Qa'ida has built a handful of cards, any of which it could be playing, all of which it intends at some point and with some opportunity to play. Its choices are very broad and very frightening."

On page 19 of the Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response, 1983-2001:

June 12, 1998 entry: "In an interview with a U.S. journalist, UBL [Usama bin Laden] indicates he may attack a U.S. military passenger aircraft using antiaircraft missiles. At a press conference ... he indicated the results of his jihad would be 'visible' within weeks."

For the full report, see http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf

Defeating the LAIRCM defense: Recall that the system utilizes staring sensors in the ultraviolet (UV) bandwidth to detect launch, then employs an infrared (IR) tracker and laser beam to interrupt the missile's guidance. One source theorized grimly that UV searchlights could be employed, shone at the target aircraft from different directions, swamping LAIRCM. The LAIRCM would be like a deer caught in the proverbial headlights and unable to discriminate the approaching threat. At the very least, terrorists armed with UV searchlights might create any number of false alarms. "Put all your available funds into a UV sensor for launch detection, and the arms dealers will be giving away a free UV laser illuminator with every SA-18 sold," the source said.

To be sure, UV searchlights are widely available for open purchase (see http://www.colorlight.com). Could such searchlights be used to confuse the UV detection algorithms in LAIRCM?

Those familiar with LAIRCM technology say, no, UV searchlights will not fool the system's warning function. It has been tested successfully against such distractions and ground clutter. Operational tests show a very low false alarm rate and a very accurate angle of arrival capability (part of the UV detectors' function is to initially aim the IR pointer- tracker toward the approaching missile). The IR pointer-tracker, working in that bandwidth, would not be spoofed by a UV searchlight. The U.S. Air Force reportedly spent considerable effort (and money) trying to develop a UV laser that looked like a missile, specifically to fool the sensor now in LAIRCM. The project failed and was abandoned.

This is not to say the system is infallible, but its designers believe LAIRCM has demonstrated the ability to defeat UV searchlights - by ignoring them in favor of the more distinctive spatial, temporal and thermal characteristics of a missile in the launch or flight phase.

As far as defeating LAIRCM at very low altitude, the system activates as soon as the "weight on wheels" switch opens on aircraft lift-off. The system is ready to defend the aircraft independent of its altitude or the direction in which the missile is fired.

Liability: Consider these scenarios:

• Aircraft is attacked by a missile, LAIRCM successfully steers missile off course, but missile strikes a shop in nearby downtown, causing property damage and some deaths and injuries.
• A missile attacks aircraft, LAIRCM successfully steers missile off course and it falls harmlessly into a nearby body of water. Liability: none.
• Aircraft attacked by missile, LAIRCM successfully steers missile away, but missile locks on another aircraft nearby not equipped with LAIRCM (say, a foreign operator), and shoots it down.
• Missile defeats LAIRCM defense and explodes, causing loss of aircraft and killing/injuring all aboard.
• In a non-attack scenario, electrical arcing in LAIRCM/aircraft interface leads to in-flight fire; aircraft lands successfully but with considerable charring of electrical bundles and adjacent thermal acoustic insulation blankets. Liability: maybe not a big issue. LAIRCM is externally mounted in "canoe" shaped fairing, which contains all the gear. Only a power and a control line are routed from inside the airplane to the unit, reducing the likelihood of this scenario.

Deployment time: As reported, equipping the entire U.S. airline fleet with LAIRCM would take place over a six-year period, 2004-2010, at an estimated cost of $3 billion. Another source commented that if al-Qa'ida is not rooted out and destroyed by 2010, the United States has a continuing problem with the quality and timeliness of its intelligence. Maybe the money for LAIRCM would be better spend going directly after al-Qa'ida. Then again, if al-Qa'ida hasn't been destroyed by that time, it or another yet unknown terrorist organization may still pose a MANPADS threat. These are just a few of the kind of speculative questions that come to mind.

Regarding the six-year timeframe to retrofit the fleet, a LAIRCM proponent said, "A lot of things can be done to speed up production." The size of the fleet is nowhere near the 6,800 aircraft in service before 9/11. If regional jets and turboprops were excluded, retrofit could be accelerated to cover the larger jets.

>> For more on LAIRCM, see http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/laircm.htm <<