Comments on the Flight Recorder Proposal

Extracts of the comments submitted To the FAA docket

On ejectable flight data recorders

From Reps. Harold Rogers (R-Ky.) and David Price (D-N.C.), members of the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee:

"The events of Sept. 11, 2001, proved that our current CVR/DFDRs [cockpit voice recorders/digital flight data recorders] are vulnerable to extreme crash scenarios. For the four airliners involved in the terrorist attacks, only two of the four FDRs were recovered. The other two FDRs have never been found. Likewise, only two CVRs were recovered, and one of those was burned beyond use, rendering it useless to investigators."

From Reps. John Duncan (R-Tenn.) and William Pascrell (D-N.J.), members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee and sponsors of the Safe Aviation Flight Enhancement (SAFE) Act calling for the installation of deployable recorders (see ASW, July 25):

"It is our understanding that very detailed commercial deployable recorder standards, called ED 112, have been developed that define the minimum specifications that must be met for the deployable recorder's design and installation on civil aircraft ? The FAA has confirmed in a recent letter to us that deployable recorders that meet the ED 112 standards would be deemed safe and suitable for installation on commercial aircraft."

From the National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation, representing the survivors and relatives of air crashes:

"The use of deployable recorder technology as a second, back up system would provide investigators with a viable, complementary approach to augment the current fixed recorders by meeting the aviation industry's demand for survivable and quickly recoverable flight recorders."

From the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA):

"We support 'dual combi' recorders [to] significantly reduce the risk of losing most or all recorded information in a hull-loss accident ? ALPA agrees that deployable devices, when not used as the sole means of data capture, could provide safety and security benefits."

From Boeing:

"We consider the survivability and recoverability of the current fixed recorders to be acceptable and do not find sufficient benefit to justify the expense of implementing deployable recorders; therefore, we do not support the use of deployable recorders."

From the International Air Transport Association (IATA):

"IATA does not believe that an introduction of an additional deployable flight recorder brings any safety benefit. To the contrary, the risk of inadvertent deployment over populated areas or on an active runway needs to be considered, especially in automatic deployment conditions."

From DRS Technologies (manufacturer of deployable recorders for military aircraft):

"Deployable recorders are complementary to fixed recorders as they protect the data in a different way: leaving the crash site versus attempting to survive the crash and post- crash environment. In this scenario, redundancy is provided like seatbelts and airbags protect a passenger of an automobile in different ways, increasing their survival rate more than two seatbelts or two airbags would. The result of this combination of recorders is increased probability that flight data is recovered, thus increasing the safety of our transportation system."

On the incorporation of combination recorders

From the NTSB:

"Recommendations discussed in the NPRM, but rejected or not addressed ? are the use of forward- and aft-mounted combination voice and data recorders ? The Safety Board hoped this rulemaking effort would take full advantage of this opportunity to require implementation of dual combined voice data and image recorders in the Airbus A380 and Boeing 787 while both were in pre-production, when installation costs would be at a minimum."

"There are a number of instances in which the circumstances of a catastrophic accident could have resulted in a forward-mounted recorder surviving and the aft-mounted recorder being lost to fire or impact.

"One example is the Air France Airbus A320, which crashed in Strasburg, France, in 1992. In this accident, the aft-mounted FDR was destroyed by fire while the unprotected quick-access recorder mounted below the cockpit survived.

"The NPRM also implies that a crash resulting in the loss of an aft-mounted recorder would most certainly result in the loss of a forward-mounted recorder. Accident history does not support this position, as illustrated in those accidents in which the aft-mounted recorders were lost. The explosion of Pan Am Flight 109, a Boeing 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland, separated the cockpit, which landed relatively intact far clear of the burning fuselage wreckage."

From Northwest Airlines (NWA):

"NWA agrees with the FAA that little or no benefit would be gained from a second CVR and DFDR. In the event of a catastrophic accident that destroyed the existing recorders, the likelihood that a second CVR and DFDR located in the front of the aircraft surviving is remote at best."

On expanding existing recorder time from 30 minutes to 2 hours

From the NTSB:

"The Safety Board applauds the FAA's proposed action ? The Board also endorses the timeline set forth in the NPRM that requires all newly manufactured aircraft to be equipped with a 2-hour CVR within two years of the rule data. The Board also agrees that the 4-year phase-in that was proposed to retrofit the existing fleet is appropriate and will not cause undue hardships in the aviation community."

From Boeing:

"Boeing agrees the additional data recorded by longer duration recorders would have been a significant benefit in several past accident investigations. We endorse this proposed requirement. The retrofit cost burden to airline operators, however, should be considered carefully before the final rule is issued."

Additional flight control parameters for 737 aircraft

From NTSB:

"This NPRM does not propose any rule changes, and because no action appears to have been taken ? in the nearly 5 years since [the recommendation] was issued, the Safety Board is concerned." [The NTSB had previously recommended that the FDR for the Boeing 737 record yaw damper command, control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces, among others.]

On the sampling rate for recorder parameters

From the NTSB:

"The Safety Board is encouraged by the FAA's proposal to increase the sampling rate of flight control parameters for newly manufactured aircraft [to 16 Hz, or samples, per second]. The Board is disappointed, however, that the proposal does not address existing aircraft, as called for in [its] recommendation."

From Boeing:

"We disagree with 16 samples per second [sps] as the necessary minimum recording rate for flight control parameters. We examined actual data traces from several past accidents and incidents where control motions were an issue. From this review, it became clear that the control motions are typically 'coupled' with the natural frequency of the airframe. The airframe natural frequency, and the frequency needing to be captured, was 0.5 Hz or less in all axes. Thus, we concluded that 4 sps is adequate to unambiguously characterize the flight control movements of all transport category aircraft certified under FAR Part 25."

From Airbus:

"We came to the conclusion that a sampling rate of 16 sps will not increase the overall quality of the recorded signals compared with the sampling intervals as proposed by Airbus [which are between 4 and 8 sps, depending on parameter].

"A mandatory required sampling interval of [16 sps] would not only affect the FDR and the associated interface units, but would also require redesign of the aircraft's source systems for the data to be recovered."

From AirTran Airways:

"AirTran believes a sampling rate of 16 Hz for each flight control input (9 total) would exceed the capacity of the DFDR system installed in our fleet to record them.

"AirTran generally agrees that more data is beneficial. As such, we support a mandated increase in sample intervals commensurate with the recording capacity of the DFDR system. For AirTran installed DFDR systems, this capacity is approximately 8 Hz [samples per second]."

Standardize recording start time by flight crew checklist

From Northwest Airlines (NWA):

"In response to the 'checklist-to-checklist' requirement ? NWA disagrees that the requirement can easily be incorporated into aircraft operations without a time for retrofit. Checklist changes can take several months to implement, unless there is an emergency FAA need. Therefore, NWA recommends that operators be allowed 3 months after the effective date of the rule to make any changes to their checklists."

Data link communications

From the NTSB:

"[The FAA states that] 'the FAA was unable to propose a practical, feasible method of capturing what the pilot sees off the actual cockpit display' and that 'there is no developed technology for reliable recording of information.' However, the Safety Board is of the opinion that an image recording of the cockpit display could provide specifics as to what data-link communications are displayed to and generated by the flight crew and when those messages are displayed or sent. An image recording would also indicate the quality of the display. Adding a properly placed cockpit video camera would allow data link messages displayed by the crew to be recorded on the image recorder. The use of video technology would not require any modifications to the aircraft's communication or display systems. This addition might greatly reduce the time and expense of retrofitting older aircraft to record data-link messages."

From the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA):

"The AAPA submits that this requirement [that all data-link communications received on an aircraft be recorded on the aircraft] be re-evaluated ? All data-link communications between aircraft and ground can to a large extent be reconstructed by accessing ground recordings (which are mandatory)."

From Embraer:

"Embraer believes that the ones that will substitute the voice communication between pilots and air traffic controller, that is, CPDLC [controller pilot data link communication] messages, shall compose the set of messages that will satisfy the goal of recording important flight deck communications."

From Honeywell (a major avionics supplier):

"Clearly identify what types of data-link messages need to be recorded ? One potential definition could consist of the following:

• All CPDLC messages that are displayed to or sent by the flight crew.
• All data-link messages received from the ground that are transferred to the Flight Management computer.
• All Airline Operational Control (AOC) text messages that are transmitted to a Communication Management Unit (or Communication Management Function) that are to be displayed to the pilot on a cockpit display."

From ALPA:

"ALPA does not concur with the FAA proposal that data-link communications be recorded on the CVR, since this would limit the duration of the information to somewhere between 30 minute and two hours. ALPA does not see any compelling reason for this proposed architecture. ALPA believes that due to its potential importance in an investigation, it is imperative to capture the data-link communications for the entire duration of any given flight. The current standard of recording 100 percent of ATC [air traffic control] voice communications and saving those recordings for up to 45 days has the effect of recording ATC communication for all of a given flight, and there is no reason to depart from that philosophy.

"In addition, recording data-link communications on the FDR instead of the CVR would preclude the mixing of what is generally considered public data (ATC communications) with highly restricted private data (the intra-cockpit audio) on the same device."

Cost benefit

From Boeing:

"The subtle 'tweaking' of existing parameters imposes increased system cost to industry."

From Airbus:

"The NPRM would result in redesign of recording systems and other systems at considerable cost. We contend that the intent of the proposal can be met at significantly lesser cost."

From Empire Airlines:

"The FAA cost/benefit analysis does not take into consideration operators have been burdened in the last two years by unfunded mandates requiring TAWS [terrain alerting warning systems], TCAS [traffic collision avoidance systems], RVSM [reduced vertical separation minimums] and ELT [emergency locator transmitter] upgrades, nor do they make an adequate case for the safety benefit that would result if these changes were adopted. While it is politically incorrect to suggest that safety recommendations may cost too much, the reality is that the operator is up against the wall and cannot expect to stay in business while funding NTSB safety recommendations, whose safety concern cannot be substantiated."

From the Regional Airline Association (RAA):

"The cost benefit analysis should cite at least one regional or commuter airplane accident in which the NTSB could 'result in corrective actions taken sooner than would have otherwise been possible' and that without improvements (in the CVR/FDR equipment), 'investigators may not have all the data vital for determining the probable cause of some future aircraft accident.'

"If the benefits of a revised cost benefit analysis are shown to be negative, RAA requests that the proposed rule mandating retrofit of current fleets be withdrawn.

"If the benefits of a revised cost benefits analysis are shown to be positive, RAA requests that the proposed two hour recording capability retrofit for the CVR be applicable only for airplanes certificated for passenger seating of 60 seats or more, and that retrofit for Part 135 operators be deleted in its entirety."

On the need for harmonization

From Boeing:

"While we agree with much of the proposal, our main concern is that it will not be harmonized with the parallel activities currently underway by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). Boeing urges the FAA not to issue the final rule until harmonization has been reached between the FAA and JAA rules, as well as with related industry technical documents and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards.

"Without harmonization, the affected industry will be faced with conflicting requirements, unjustifiably high costs of compliance, and potentially complex system designs in an attempt to satisfy two different sets of regulations. With harmonization, there is the opportunity not only to standardize, but to stabilize flight recorder requirements."

From Airbus:

"The proposed changes in this NPRM deviate clearly from the in parallel ongoing rulemaking activities of JAA ? This would lead once again to two different design solutions necessary to comply with the FAA and European regulations.

"Especially for data-link recording, the current situation could be used by FAA, JAA and EASA [European Aviation Safety Agency] to develop a common standard in this early stage of the introduction."