The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently called for new requirements for pilots flying in Part 121, 135 and 91 subpart K operations to address fatigue as well as to require additional training regarding rejected landings and takeoffs.
The board also called for pilot unions, the
Regional Airline Association, and the
Air Transport Association, to develop a specific, standardized policy allowing flight crewmembers to decline assignments or remove themselves from duty if they were impaired by a lack of sleep. However, given the scope of any new regulatory, it would require participation from all user groups. It would also have whatever policy is developed not only be incorporated into regulations but be provided to pilots in writing, with details of administrative implications of fatigue calls.
Echoing sentiments expressed by
FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Nick Sabatini that regulations do not require rejected take off straining, the
National Transportation Safety Board called on the
FAA to require such training. Sabatini’s remarks were made during the
National Air Transportation Association Air Charter Summit when he said he favored single-level-of-safety regulations be extended to charter operations.
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The Board recommended requiring all Part 121, 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a rapid reduction in visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver.The NTSB also recommended the execution of maximum performance landings while requiring new polices that either pilot (in a two-pilot environment) can make a go-around callout that must be followed.
The Board would also have the same pilots include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots in accomplishing maximum performance landings on contaminated runways.
Aviation Today’s VLJ Report’s sister publication
Air Safety Week recently published a two part series on fatigue outlining the issue.
FAA Tackles Fatigue Head On
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) June 17-19 held an aviation fatigue management symposium, the first event sponsored by the U.S. aviation agency that focused specifically on managing fatigue in all aspects of aviation, whether suffered aboard aircraft, in the hanger on the flight line, or in air traffic control facilities.
The three main symposium objectives were to: provide the most current information on fatigue physiology, management, and mitigation alternatives; develop a common understanding of fatigue issues and identify challenges; and, forge collaborative alliances to initiate actionable mitigation strategies.
Attendees included representatives of domestic and foreign air carriers, aviation associations, aircraft manufacturers, academia and government air safety organizations. But the symposium was closed to the public and media despite increased interest in the subject.
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently urging the FAA to take steps to manage pilot fatigue, which the Safety Board cited as factors in two non-fatal regional jet mishaps in 2007 and one incident earlier this year.
The NTSB said a regional jet overran the end of a runway in Michigan last year because the pilots elected to land on a snowy runway without performing the required landing distance calculations.
The mishap occurred on April 12 when a
Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19 operated as
Pinnacle Airlines 4712 ran off the departure end of Runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC) Traverse City, MI. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers and three crewmembers.
The probable cause determination cited the pilots' decision to land without performing a landing distance assessment, which was required by company policy because of runway contamination reported by ground operations personnel
The Safety Board said "this poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day, and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions." Had the pilots made the required calculations, using current weather information, the results would have shown that the runway length was inadequate for the contaminated runway conditions described.
This past February a
go! regional jet flight from Honolulu to Hilo, Hawaii, overshot its destination. Controllers repeatedly attempted to contact the crew for over 18 minutes as it strayed off course. The passenger jet traveled 26 nautical miles beyond its intended destination before the flight crew responded to a controller's frantic calls. NTSB investigators said the two go! pilots, who were fired, had unintentionally fallen asleep.
The NTSB previously determined that the probable cause of a
Shuttle America Embraer ERJ- 170 accident earlier this year in Cleveland was the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable.
In its final report on the accident investigation, the Safety Board noted that the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing, contributed to the accident.
As a result of the aforementioned accidents/incidents, the Safety Board made two recommendations to the FAA addressing human fatigue within airline operations.
The Safety Board advised the FAA to develop guidance, based on empirical and scientific evidence, for operators to establish fatigue management systems, including information about the content and implementation of these systems.
The Board also drafted an advisement for the U.S. aviation agency to develop and use methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of fatigue management systems implemented by operators, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents.
The FAA aviation fatigue symposium included opening keynote addresses by Acting FAA Administrator Robert Sturgell and NTSB Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt.
Sturgell said: "I think we all acknowledge that even with an outstanding safety record, we're not where we need to be when it comes to understanding and dealing with fatigue. This meeting aims to put us on a level playing field with what we know, with what we understand.
"At this conference, I want to look at new ways to manage fatigue for all personnel in this industry, the most current information on fatigue physiology, management and mitigation alternatives. I encourage you to leave your day job at the door. Think outside the box. Specifically, black ones.
"As we move forward, we need to define what is an acceptable level of fatigue risk and what levels of fatigue must be minimized. We need to come to agreement on what studies or data would be needed to provide those definitions.
"I'm not talking necessarily about adopting prescriptive criteria for fatigue risk abatement. All options will be considered. I think we need to address all levels of fatigue and put appropriate mitigations in place -- mitigations that are proportionate to the risk.
"We're trying to do something innovative here with a topic that generates a lot of emotion and anecdotal claims. My hope is that the conversations we're about to have will bring some clarity to the issue and help us decide where to go using a data-driven approach.
"This isn't a venue for arguments about economics, and it's not about contract negotiations. But it is a chance for us to give a boost to safety where one is needed," Sturgell stated.
NTSB experts discussed operational factors contributing to fatigue during flight operations and in the air traffic control towers. Much of the time was devoted to development and implementation of fatigue risk management systems (FRMS).
Other sessions looked at the effects of fatigue on long-haul flights and fatigue issues related to shift work. The three-day session concluded with a group discussion on future fatigue mitigation initiatives.
Air traffic controllers participated in the symposium. But having seen enough of the agency's continued refusal to comply with NTSB recommendations to work collaboratively with
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) on controller fatigue issues, NATCA announced its own plans to develop a fatigue management system that will contain a variety of policies and countermeasures that are all focused on decreasing the likelihood of fatigue in the workplace.
The FAA symposium, said NATCA President Patrick Forrey, is "nothing more than another FAA publicity stunt, designed to show an appearance of concern for this issue. Holding a symposium on fatigue is like the big oil companies holding a symposium on high gas prices."
Next Week: FAA & Fatigue Part II