The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the captain of Colgan Air Flight 3407 inappropriately responded to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. The Safety Board's probable cause determination also said additional flight crew failures contributed to the accident.

On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier DHC-8- 400 (N200WQ) operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407 was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International, Buffalo, NY, when it crashed into a residence about five nautical miles northeast of the airport. The two pilots, two flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground also died.

Contributing to the accident were the crewmembers' failure to: recognize the position of the low-speed cue on their flight displays, which indicated that the stick shaker was about to activate; and, their failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. Other factors were the captain's failure to effectively manage the flight; and, Colgan Air's inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) says the probable cause determination in the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident ignores the bulk of longstanding aviation issues.

Capt. John Prater, ALPA's president. said "during its discussions, the Board identified the need to improve training, develop experience, improve cockpit displays, enhance oversight, and provide better weather information to crews. However, the statement of probable cause failed to fully and directly acknowledge the many factors that contributed to this accident. Creating a safer industry means looking at all the reasons why this tragedy occurred and taking aggressive action to ensure nothing similar happens again."

ALPA said "the NTSB missed a valuable opportunity to highlight the many factors that combined to cause this tragedy. The conclusion of simple pilot error ignores the multitude of contributing factors in every accident."

As regards archaic duty-time rules for pilots, ALPA said the FAA's timeline for modernizing airline pilots' flight-time and duty-time has slipped from the original target. "For years, ALPA has been calling for science-based rules that apply equally to all operations, including domestic, international, and supplemental flying. Our passengers and crews deserve to have a final rule in place before the end of 2010."

ALPA also emphasizes airline management's role and responsibility in developing a corporate culture centered on safety and that is designed to detect trends and implement solutions to enhance safety.

The NTSB recently revised its 'Most Wanted' safety list, calling for improved oversight of airline pilot proficiency.

That safety recommendation emerged from the Safety Board's probe into the Colgan Air crash. During those hearings, airline executives testified they were unaware that the pilot had failed several check rides before he was hired at Colgan.

The NTSB said oversight of pilot proficiency is lacking. This new issue area added by the Safety Board contains two 2005 recommendations calling on the FAA to require airlines to obtain histories of flight check failures by pilot applicants and to require special training programs for pilots who have demonstrated performance deficiencies.

A second addition to the 'Most Wanted" list involves image recorders. Although cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) and flight data recorders (FDRs) record sounds and relatively comprehensive airplane data during an emergency, they do not show the critical cockpit environment leading up to the emergency. The Safety Board has requested image recorders for large transport category aircraft and for smaller aircraft that do not otherwise have recording devices.

While supporting nearly all the NTSB's Most Wanted Safety Improvements, ALPA, remains adamantly opposed to the Board's recommendation for the use of cockpit image recorders.

"Well-proven and far superior methods exist to gather safety information without the threat of becoming the distraction in the cockpit that video cameras pose," believes Prater. "Cameras also hold the potential to compromise the accident investigation process and invade privacy. In addition, the absence of international safeguards makes it a virtual certainty that such data would be misused. These powerful drawbacks make it clear that cockpit image recorders have no place in a commitment to advancing aviation safety."