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Friday, August 24, 2007

Troubling Regional Safety Trends Cited by NTSB

Three regional accidents were cited in a speech by National Transportation Safety Board Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt indicated there might be a worrisome pattern that regional pilots may not be keeping their eye on the ball. Speaking before the Air Line Pilots Association International’s (ALPA) Annual Air Safety & Security Forum earlier this month, Sumwalt stressed the importance of adhering to standard operating procedures. He talked about FAA Line Operation Safety Audit findings, which indicated that a crew who doesn’t follow standard operating procedures is three times as likely to make mistakes.
Sumwalt strongly believes in ‘safety culture’ and he has been critical of organizations that fail to establish such a culture. “Just as it is incumbent on senior airline management to establish and maintain a safety culture,” said Sumwalt, “it’s also up to people on the front lines to carry out their responsibilities with precision and professionalism.”
He cited three fatal regional accidents in as many years. While the Safety Board has not yet determined the probable cause for one of these, the others reveal “disturbing evidence of behavior that is unbecoming of the airline piloting profession,” he noted.
In October 2004, Pinnacle Airlines (PNCL) Flight 3701 crashed on a repositioning flight. NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be, in part: “the pilots’ unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover.” Related Story
The following week, Corporate Airlines, doing business as American Connection crashed on approach into Kirksville, Missouri. Related Story  This CFIT accident claimed 13 lives. The Safety Board concluded that “the pilots’ nonessential conversation below 10,000 feet MSL was contrary to established sterile cockpit regulations and reflected a demeanor and cockpit environment that fostered deviation from established standard procedures, crew resource management disciplines, division of duties, and professionalism, reducing the margin of safety well below acceptable limits during the accident approach and likely contributed to the pilots’ degraded performance.”
And several weeks ago, the Safety Board deliberated the Comair 5191 accident, concluding that non-adherence to FARs, company procedures and checklist discipline set the stage for the accident. Specifically, the Board members ruled that the crew’s noncompliance with SOPs, including the captain’s abbreviated taxi briefing and both pilots’ non-pertinent conversation, most likely created an atmosphere in the cockpit that enabled the crew’s errors.
Sumwalt listened to the Comair cockpit voice recording several times and heard “two guys that were trying very hard to be relaxed and easy-going. They were trying to get along well and be friendly. But, I believe their cockpit demeanor was too comfortable.
“I recognize that it is important to be comfortable in the cockpit,” he continued. “FAA guidance on CRM states that that the tone in the cockpit should be ‘friendly, relaxed, and supportive.’ But it also points out that the crew must ensure that cockpit discipline is maintained, crew vigilance is not reduced and critical items are not missed. And on this flight, critical items were missed.”
He recalled that former NTSB Board Member John Lauber said “There is a fine line separating a relaxed and easy atmosphere in a cockpit from a lax one where distractions can result in critical failures. Professionalism may be described as knowing the difference between the two.”
“We have had an extraordinary safety record in the past few years,” he said. “But, my colleagues on the Board and I are disturbed that all three of these accidents…have all involved a less than professional approach to airmanship. Put bluntly, professionals don’t intentionally violate Federal Regulations. And remember, the sterile cockpit is a regulation, not just a good operating practice. I can tell you that it is extremely disheartening to listen to a CVR where joking, laughing, off-hand comments and sterile cockpit violations are heard right before the crash.”
He threw out a challenge to assembled ALPA members. “As aviation leaders, I suggest that you not only have the ability to influence safety, but you have the obligation to do so, as well.
“So, next time you ride jump seat or fly a trip, when you see someone violating the sterile cockpit or being a little loose with callouts or checklist items, what are you going to do? Are you going to let it go, or are you going to say something about it?
“If you let it go, you are providing tacit approval, which reinforces this undesirable behavior,” he continued. “In your position as aviation leaders, if you accept anything less than standard, you send a message to others that it is okay to perform to a lower standard. Professionalism is a mindset that includes hallmarks such as precise checklist usage, precise callouts, precise compliance with SOPs and regulations, including sterile cockpit compliance. Quite simply, professionalism means doing the right things, even when no one is watching. There is no excuse for violating the sterile cockpit. Period. It is a violation of CARs and FARs. I look at procedures as layers of defense that can trap our errors. If we don’t follow procedures, we are effectively putting holes in these layers of defense.
He cautioned that ignoring deviation tends to normalize them. “This ‘normalization of deviance,’ is problematic because crewmembers can view this new way of doing business as the norm,” he warned. “We get so used to it that the crew can eventually fail to see their actions as being deviations. Leaders influence others. Whether you are a line pilot, check airman, VP of flight operations, or air safety representative, I challenge you to go out and influence professional behavior on the line. Insist on it. Accept nothing less.”