The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) proposed rules for the safe transit of air cargo appear to have raised more questions in the regional air cargo industry than the draft rules have clarified.

While overall, small air cargo carriers were thankful that the operators of a converted 19-seat aircraft will not be treated the same as a jumbojet freighter, the common theme among the 115 responses filed before the Jan. 10 comment deadline was: the agency needs to go back to the drawing board and better refine the language of its suggested rules.

The 37-page TSA document spells out new security rules for air freight operators, airports and courier firms (CRAN. Nov. 22). It was a two-year effort of the agency and the Aviation Security Advisory Council. However, members of the committee, including the Regional Airline Association (RAA), note that the TSA did not always follow the council's suggestions, especially on the operational level. Others, like the Regional Air Cargo Carriers Association (RACCA), claim TSA still does not understand the operations of Part 135 cargo carriers because these small operators did not have a seat on the council.

TSA is now reviewing the comments and will consider the suggestions as it begins to write the final rules, said spokeswoman Deirdre O'Sullivan. In the recently passed intelligence reform measure, Congress mandated that the TSA have its final air cargo safety rules adopted by Aug. 14, she said.

Following is a sampling of some of the suggestions various trade groups or companies offered to the TSA during the comment period.

No Fly Lists

RACCA: "There appears to be a requirement for an operator to check direct employees against the 'no-fly' list each time a new list is issued." However, the proposal does not address indirect employees, such as couriers.

Security Threat Assessment

RAA: "The proposed language appears much broader than the scope recommended by the Aviation Security Advisory Council as it could conceivably apply to individuals who work outside the airport environment." While the RAA supports the TSA's plan to use criminal background checks or security threat assessments for individuals with unescorted access to air cargo, the TSA's explanation of the security threat assessment "is difficult to understand."

RACCA: Clarification is needed as to who would need to be investigated. One of the biggest concerns in the process is how long will it take for the TSA to turn around threat assessments. If every person who is hired to work inside the airport fence is required to be investigated it could take weeks or even months before a new person could begin work. In addition the $39 fee suggested for the background check is unrealistically low, with $100 the more realistic estimate. Also unclear from the proposed rules is whether a successful background check would be portable if the person changed jobs, the association said.

Chubb Insurance: "The security threat assessments should be designed to gather information that goes beyond the criminal background checks. Financial records and drug and alcohol screening should be considered. The idea is to identify individuals that are known terrorists, but you need also to be aware of those who could be more vulnerable to incentives for complicit actions."

Cargo Airline Association (CAA): "We suggest that any new security threat assessment program mirror existing programs in the passenger arena whereby any name records are supplied to the government and then vetted against existing terrorist lists. There is simply no need to establish yet another 'stand alone' bureaucratic program of background checks - and to charge the industry an exorbitant $39 per person for this service."

Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA): "Multiple standards for clearing persons with unescorted access privileges to cargo are ill advised." The practice of allowing unvetted employees to ride along on an all-cargo plane as an employment benefit needs to be reconsidered. Likewise, "it should be noted that many foreign nationals travel as animal attendants aboard all-cargo aircraft and often are in possession of items normally prohibited on aircraft," ALPA said.

Airfield Security Zones

RAA: "The proposal as written is too expensive as it would cover areas where cargo is sorted, which could be outside of the perimeter of the airport. The language as currently written is too broad and could be interpreted to require the screening of all individuals boarding the aircraft. The TSA should conduct all screening or pay all the costs associated with the screening."

RACCA: The rules need to be analyzed from a cost-benefit standpoint. "In many areas, cargo loading takes place on public areas of rural airports which would be difficult or impossible to secure. If taken to the extreme, this could mean that every employee who is potentially inside of an airport fence would need a criminal background check, fingerprinting and a threat assessment."

National Air Transportation Association (NATA): "The costs for this proposal and the potential safety impacts for nearby general aviation areas have not been adequately considered by the TSA."

Ameriflight: "In our company alone, the number of employees at any given moment subject to this requirement would be 350 to 500. This generates an instantaneous cost of $52,850 to more than $75,000. Add to that the fact that employee turnover in these jobs commonly exceeds 50 percent per annum, we would see this program costing us more than $100,000 annually. Such a cost would be difficult to absorb by any of the small package carriers."

Cargo Security Solutions: "The rules lack definition, uniformity, compliance requisites and standards, and ultimately dilute any security measures that it is trying to enact."

Indianapolis International Airport: The FedEx facility on the airport grounds could pose a problem if the airport is required to issue airport badges to 2,500 working at the cargo facility. The airport proposes that the FedEx company identification badge become an airport-approved badge for the facility.

American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE): "The TSA terminology used to outline the SIDA [Security Identification Display Areas] expansion requirement is unclear as to the definition of loading and unloading areas. Also TSA does not adequately address the logistical difficulties of securing a cargo area which in many situations are areas that are also used for general aviation operations, fixed base operators or public areas such as throughways."

Sioux Falls Regional Airport: "Our cargo ramp was not constructed with the idea of controlling access. To reconfigure that part of the airport, to put all cargo areas together would be about $750,000. We do not have the security force to patrol the cargo ramp to ensure only SIDA-badged individuals are present. There is nothing in the proposed regulations about flight crews. Most of the cargo feeder pilots do not wear uniforms and will not have SIDA badges. How are airports supposed to handle that?"

Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA): The SIDA area should not be extended to the areas regularly used to sort cargo, but the expansion should be limited to those areas where the cargo is loaded onto the aircraft. "Airports should not be required to extend 'cargo' SIDA requirements into tenant lease areas. Cargo operators will be faced with significant operational issues if TSA requires the airport to expand SIDA requirements to an entire tenant facility."

Application of 'Twelve-Five' rule

RAA: Supports the application of the "twelve-five" security program to those aircraft heavier than 12,500 pounds.

Cargo Security Solutions: An airplane's gross weight should not be a factor in determining the level of security needed. "Having varying levels of security for different sizes of aircraft leaves holes in the entire system. For example, a Cessna Caravan can carry in excess of 2,000 pounds of freight, enough to cause serious damage in a metropolitan area should the payload be of malicious intent. It would be less complicated, more precise and more efficient if a set of minimum of security standards were applied to all freight."

CAA: "Carriers with multiple aircraft sizes will not, we assume, be required to apply large aircraft rules to its aircraft that are not over 45,500 kilograms. It would be helpful if this interpretation is confirmed in the final rule."

Cargo screening

RAA: The proposed procedures would disrupt the flow of the U.S. supply chain because it would eliminate the cargo from thousands of retail cargo acceptance locations. Passenger carriers should be allowed to carry cargo from unknown shippers according a carrier's security program.

RACCA: The proposed rule that would require a cargo carrier to refuse any shipment that the shipper will not permit [packages] to be opened for inspection. The rule would mean the transport of currency, bullion, jewelry, hazardous materials and pharmaceuticals would not be permitted if clients object to the breaking of seals for inspections. A delay to inspect human organs or nuclear medicines could damage the goods. "A requirement to visually inspect 10 percent of all packages will cause severe delays." A small cargo plane with a 1,500-pound payload can carry several hundred individual packages.

Cargo Security Solutions: "The known shippers program is very easily exploited and should not be used as a primary line of defense. An individual can ship illicit or malicious freight with a known shipper who does not adequately inspect freight. For the known shippers program to be effective, there must be oversight on the part of the TSA at all levels." Furthermore, an individual could ship something through FedEx or UPS - and similar know shippers - and the package could end up on a passenger plane without further inspection.

Northern Air Cargo: "If the regulations require that each item be screened via a mechanical detection device, we would like to know who will be responsible for purchasing, maintaining and calibrating this equipment. A device suitable to screen the types of items that we carry, such as vehicles, lumber, electronics and large quantities of hazardous materials, could be beyond the financial realm of a company our size and any of the smaller air carriers that operation in Alaska."

National Small Shipments Traffic Conference (NSSTC): "For TSA to regulate all known shippers would represent a monumental expansion of TSA authority raising serious legal and policy questions. Would all of America's manufacturing facilities have to be fenced? Would every manufacturer's employees be subject to security screenings?"

IBM: "Proposals to prohibit all cargo from passenger aircraft or mandate unimplementable physical inspection requirements would severely undermine our ability to meet customer needs." IBM noted that 60 percent of all air freight capacity is provided on passenger aircraft.

Training:

RACCA: "The small airplane cargo carriers need to know what types of training is going to be required. Is TSA going to provide standardized syllabi for such training? If so, how will TSA ensure that the training is practicable and applicable to all operators?"

>>Contacts: Deborah McElroy, RAA, (202) 367-1170; Stan Bernstein, RACCA, (508) 778-7788; Barry Tarnef, Chubb, (908) 903-2000; Stephen Alterman, CAA, (202) 293-1030; William McReynolds, ALPA, (703) 689-2270; Eric Byer, NATA, (800) 808-6282; Mark Livingston, Ameriflight, (818) 980-5005; Robert Davis, Cargo Security Solutions, (972) 316-8448; Carter Morris, AAAE, (703) 824-0500; Bill Reardon, Indianapolis International Airport, (317) 487-5395; Gary Messerli, Sioux Falls Airport, (605) 366-0762; Stephanie A Holthaus, Northern Air Cargo, (907) 243-3331; John Cutler, NSSTC, (202) 775-5560; Kimberly Marsho, IBM, (202) 515-4522. All filings are available on the FAA docket as TSA-2004-19515<<