A report approved by the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) contains recommendations to ramp up security for cargo-only aircraft. The recommendations could adversely affect regional air cargo carriers because they may have to abide by the same rules as large commercial cargo carriers, which could put them at an economic disadvantage.

While the report was not made public, several news organizations managed to obtain a copy. The study's key recommendation urged the government to develop ways to better verify the identities of shippers and ensure that they are not on "watch lists" of known terrorists. The report also proposed that the government allow cargo from unknown recipients to fly on passenger planes if it is screened.

The report included views of many dissenters, who said the government's measures to prevent terrorists from planting bombs in the cargo holds of passenger aircraft are inadequate. They urged the government to physically inspect all air cargo before it is loaded onto aircraft, perhaps by deploying screening technology similar to what is used for checked luggage.

But such requirements could be prohibitive for regional air cargo carriers.

"The utilization of a single approach to improve air cargo security is simply not appropriate," Stan Bernstein, president of the Regional Air Cargo Carriers Association (RACCA), told CRAN. "The size and scope of cargo-only operations vary greatly and should be dealt with in ways that fit the need.

"On-demand cargo operations utilizing single engine aircraft, operated from remote airports should not be regulated in the same way as jet operations in large urban centers," Bernstein added. "An example of appropriate regulation is the TSA's Twelve Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP). This program is now in effect and the TSA has begun to notify operators of pending inspections.

"RACCA will be watching for any proposed changes to the current security regulations and will respond to them with appropriate comments."

The National Air Transportation Association (NATA), a founding member of the ASAC, took part in many of the discussions leading to the final recommendations on all-cargo aircraft security. Much of the all-cargo working group's efforts, however, focused on large airliner-type aircraft used as freighters.

The result is a series of recommendations focused on larger aircraft but which would likely apply similar security standards to smaller aircraft and their operators, said Joseph "Jeb" Burnside, an NATA vice president who participated in the working group.

"The ASAC's working group presumed that one set of rules designed to work with large aircraft at large airports can also be implemented by on-demand cargo operators at smaller community airports," Burnside said. "These facilities and the aircraft operators using them lack the resources or infrastructure necessary to meet the objectives of the working group's security scheme. This distinction was not acknowledged by the working group and is a major problem with the recommendations."

The TSA plans to spend $85 million on air cargo security this year and said it will focus more of its attention on the issue now that it has made improvements in passenger and luggage security.

Current technology is too slow, difficult to adapt and untested to immediately begin screening all air cargo for explosives, technology firms, government officials and government reports say.

Cargo security reentered the spotlight after a man shipped himself from New York to Texas in the cargo hold of an aircraft last month. The incident underscored what government investigators have long known: that air cargo is rarely if ever inspected.

Capt. Duane Woerth, president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), said the stowaway incident is just the kind of cargo security breach that his organization has been warning government and industry about.

"If a garden-variety fugitive from justice can place himself on a cargo airliner for two days by the mere act of stowing away in a plain wooden crate, how hard would it be for trained, determined terrorists to do the same thing, armed with weapons and explosives?" Woerth asked.

Despite the significant strides U.S. security forces have made in securing passenger airliners, security improvements at cargo airlines have been "grossly inadequate," he said.

"The failure of cargo carriers to improve their post-9/11 security virtually guarantees that they will continue to be the weakest link in our efforts to keep terrorists away from airliners," Woerth added. "A cargo airliner full of boxes makes just as deadly a guided missile as a passenger airliner full of people."

>>Contacts: Stan Bernstein, RACCA, 508-778-7788; Clifton Stroud, NATA, 800-808-6282; John Mazor, ALPA, 703-481-4440.<<