Regional Aviation News :: Sumwalt Questions Regional Safety Margins

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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vice Chair Robert Sumwalt used a recent Board hearing on a Shuttle America runway overrun to raise questions regarding the regional airline industry’s overall commitment to air safety, a familiar theme considering how often he has discussed it in the last year. Related Story The issue caught the attention of veteran New York Times aviation reporter Matt Wald who said that while focus is on missed inspections and failed FAA oversight, what worries aviation safety experts is runway safety and specifically the performance of regional airlines. His article seemed to beg the question as to why regionals don’t equip their aircraft with available technology prior to any FAA requirement.
“I want to see if there is a disparity between the levels of safety for regional air carriers and the major airlines...When a family gets on an aircraft at a small town for their annual pilgrimage to Disney World, they more than likely will get on a regional aircraft. I want to make sure that there is at least equivalent or higher levels of safety when they get on that regional aircraft,” said Sumwalt at the NTSB hearing.
Sumwalt noted that industry safety data shows that between 1997-2006 runway overruns was the fourth largest cause of aircraft fatalities worldwide resulting in 262 fatalities. The former airline pilot said the regional airline industry has grown to the point that regionals now carry about 20 percent of the overall passenger load and operate about half of the total number of air carrier operations and needs to at least match the major carriers in air safety.
Over the last five years, there have been four fatal U.S. regional airline accidents resulting in 85 deaths. During the same period, there was one major airline fatal accident, resulting in one fatality.
Sumwalt asked why there is a disparity between the two segments of the industry. But in pointing out the disparity, the Safety Board vice chairman said his interest “is to motivate the regional airline industry to continue the progress that has raised the safety bar for all of us.”
He said ‘safety’ includes a combination of factors that, taken together, help drive down the accident rate. Sumwalt praised how data collection programs, such as the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program, help to identify problems before they result in air crashes.
A survey of 14 major airlines and 21 regional carriers shows that 93 percent of the long-haul carriers and 91 percent of the regionals conduct ASAP, which Sumwalt says is “good news.” But only one of the 21 regional airlines, or five percent of those surveyed, conduct FOQA programs. This compares to 86 percent of the long hauls surveyed. “This is not in the spirit of what the Safety Board would like to see. I am disappointed and concerned that the regional carriers have not done more to implement FOQA,” he stated.
Wald noted that the last airliner crash in the U.S. was the Comair flight in Lexington, Ky. in 2006 in which the crew took off on the wrong runway killing 49 of the 50 people on board. He also said that runway collisions are almost always human error, adding that they are mostly preventable with technology already on the market but not required by the FAA, despite long-term efforts by the NTSB to get them required. Such requirements have been on the board’s Most Wanted List for over a decade.
While covering FAA’s efforts to stem the rising number of runway incidents, he reported that the Department of Transportation Inspector General recently told Congress that FAA’s efforts would likely be late and over budget. In addition, Wald noted that FAA’s most recent decisions would likely forestall a requirement “by at least more than a decade.”
“The technology gap that remains between the air and the ground is striking,” wrote Wald in his New York Times article, which quoted former Air Line Pilots Association President Randy Babbitt. ‘You can fly an aircraft across the Pacific or across the Atlantic, and at any point in that journey you know where you are within about three meters, until you get on the ground,’ said Babbitt. ‘If you’ve got a G.P.S. in your car, you have infinitely more detailed information about where you are than in the cockpit of an airplane on the ground at Kennedy.’ An approaching plane can find a runway end in near-zero visibility, but can then get lost once on the surface.”
Wald’s report focused on a Honeywell Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS), combining a GPS receiver with runway and taxiway databases.
“In a demonstration in February at Washington Dulles International Airport, a test pilot, Anson Gray, showed how it was impossible to inadvertently take off from a taxiway, a surprisingly frequent error,” Wald reported. “He pushed his twin-engine business jet up to 40 knots, and an urgent mechanical voice warned: ‘On Taxiway! On Taxiway! On Taxiway!’ Then [he] entered a runway only 900 feet from the end, pivoted toward that end and began to taxi as if for takeoff. ‘Nine hundred feet remaining!’ it squawked. When that plane descends below 500 feet with the landing gear down, if the system does not sense a runway within half a mile, it tells the crew to pull up. If there is a runway, it announces the runway number, eliminating another potential error.”
He noted that the system has a major drawback in its inability to see other planes, adding that the $17,000 price is an obstacle as well. However, he pointed out that it would have alerted the Comair pilots. Related Story “A more capable system, one that gives each cockpit a screen that shows the plane’s own position and the position, equipment type and relative speed of every other plane in the neighborhood, has been demonstrated repeatedly by the Cargo Airline Association,” he wrote. Related Story
However, the Regional Airline Association questions the benefits of the related ADS-B Out proposed rule, saying fleet equipage for ADS-B Out would likely exceed the $4.73-million benefit use of the system offers. The RAA joined the Air Transport Association (ATA) in objecting to the proposed rule requiring ADS-B Out on all aircraft by 2020. It also requested the Federal Aviation Administration re-write its benefits analysis. Other organizations complained that the proposed ADS-B equipment is too robust for current needs and FAA should be looking at evolutionary introduction of airborne equipment rather than the revolutionary equipment proposed as part of its October 2007 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Related Story
Wald reported that the NTSB objected to FAA’s failure to provide a safety value to the system but focused solely on its ability to aid in air traffic congestion. “One accident that saves a passenger aircraft or two, and the cost-benefit analysis will have been well served by the implementation,” Wald quoted Chair Mark Rosenker as saying.

Shuttle America Conclusions
The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the Feb. 18, 2007 Shuttle America Embraer ERJ- 170 accident (Delta Connection Flight 6448) at Cleveland-Hopkins International was the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable during snowy conditions. Related Story
"Professional pilots have the daunting task of operating these passenger aircraft on a daily basis under a variety of weather conditions," says NTSB Chair Mark V. Rosenker. "Their decision making process and training must be comprehensive enough to take all conditions into account."
Contributing to the accident was the crew's decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude. Because the flight crewmembers were advised that the glideslope was unusable, they should not have executed the approach to ILS minimums; instead, they should have set up, briefed, and accomplished the approach to localizer (glideslope out) minimums.”
Also contributing to the accident was the first officer's long landing on a short, contaminated runway and the crew's failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness. When the first officer lost sight of the runway just before landing, he should have abandoned the landing attempt and immediately executed a missed approach.
Furthermore, the NTSB said that had the flight crew used the reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness, the airplane would likely have stopped before the end of the runway.
The Board concluded that specific training for pilots in applying maximum braking and maximum reverse thrust on contaminated runways until a safe stop is ensured would reinforce the skills needed to successfully accomplish such landings.
In its final report on the accident investigation, the Safety Board noted that the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing, contributed to the accident. By not advising Shuttle America of this fatigue or removing himself from duty, the captain placed himself, his crew, and his passengers in a dangerous situation that could have been avoided, the Board reasoned. Another contributing factor to the accident, the Safety Board said, was Shuttle America's failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals. The NTSB believes the policy had limited effectiveness because the specific details of the policy were not documented in writing and were not clearly communicated to pilots, especially the administrative implications or consequences of calling in as fatigued.
Air Safety Week Editor Ramon Lopez contributed to this story.

Sumwalt Questions Regional Safety Margins

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