Chalk’s Accident Caused by Poor Maintenance

The National Transportation Safety Board ruled last week that the probable cause of the December 2005 Chalk’s seaplane accident “was a failure of Chalk’s Ocean Airways’ maintenance program to identify and properly repair fatigue cracks in the wing.” It also said the company had...

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The National Transportation Safety Board ruled last week that the probable cause of the December 2005 Chalk’s seaplane accident “was a failure of Chalk’s Ocean Airways’ maintenance program to identify and properly repair fatigue cracks in the wing.” It also said the company had a “sloppy” safety culture and cited the FAA’s failure to spot the maintenance problems despite numerous indicators including financial problems, numerous management changes and pilot concerns over maintenance.
The board reiterated its long-standing concern with older aircraft as well as the recommendation issued last July to lift the exemption for older aircraft, type-certificated before January 1, 1958, from a requirement for more rigorous damage tolerance-based supplemental inspections. It said that pre-existing damage to wing structural components would not have been visible to the flight crew prior to departure.
While the FAA has been addressing aging aircraft, the board marked this recommendation, “open, unacceptable.” It also recommended the FAA verify airline maintenance programs include stringent criteria to address recurring or systemic problems, if necessary through comprehensive engineering evaluations; and, to modify procedures for oversight of maintenance programs of carriers like Chalk's to ensure the continued airworthiness of the operator's fleet.
"This accident tragically illustrates a gap in the safety net with regard to older airplanes," said NTSB Chair Mark V. Rosenker said during last week’s hearing. "The signs of structural problems were there - but not addressed. And to ignore continuing problems is to court disaster. Their safety program was inadequate. It glares at you, this was a poorly operated airline. Does it make sense that rules designed to deal with the problems of airplanes as they age would exclude the oldest ones in the inventory?"
As evidence of internal structural problems, the Board cited a history of fuel leaks in the area, wing corrosion problems and patches to repair the right wing three times between 1991 and 2000, nothing that would have restored the load capability of the wing. In fact, it found a 16-inch crack in the fuselage after examining the wreckage.
“The failure of Chalk's to identify and properly repair fatigue cracks in the wing, and the numerous maintenance-related problems found on the accident airplane and another company airplane, demonstrated that Chalk's maintenance program was inadequate to maintain the structural integrity of the company's fleet,” the Board said.
On December 19, 2005, a Grumman Turbo Mallard (G-73T) amphibious airplane, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Bimini, Bahamas, experienced an in-flight separation of its right wing from the fuselage and crashed into the shipping channel adjacent to the Port of Miami shortly after takeoff. Two crew and 18 passengers on board were killed.
The accident airplane, manufactured in 1947, was operating within its certificated design envelope, said the board, and carrying normal aerodynamic loads when the wing separated. The board also found the airline used the antiquated, 165-pound average per-passenger weight rather than the updated 190-pound weight, leaving one member to question how often Chalk’s aircraft exceeded gross weight.
The board also cited the 40,000-plus water takeoffs and landings as adding additional structural stress, according to Investigator in Charge Bill English, who added that such operations should have raised additional concerns with the FAA. Other operational problems that should have raised flags included the fact that Chalks had lost more than $1 million a year for several years before the accident. In addition, there were several management changes which included piling on too much work for remaining managers to accomplish their critical safety work. It noted that the captain of the flight had recently been appointed director of safety but had no time to accomplish her job after flying a full schedule. Indeed, it pointed out the concerns raised by numerous pilots about the shape of the aircraft. One captain, said the board, said the trimmed down maintenance operation was “blatant neglect.” Several others resigned.
It said FAA oversight took on a greater importance with the limited manufacturer support for the aircraft. While FAA did its job within federal regulations, it was not good enough to detect and correct maintenance program deficiencies and “therefore, was insufficient to ensure the safety of operations.” It reported the FAA was “comfortable” with the airline’s program despite red flags, including the consistent problem with fuel leaks.
After the FAA grounded all U.S. Mallards, including the four in Chalk’s fleet, Chalks shut down before resuming operations recently without seaplanes. It flights, serving Fort Lauderdale and Key West to Freeport, Marsh Harbour, Treasure Cay, Bimini, and Nassau, are operated by Bimini Island Air, according to its web site. It had been using Beech 1900Ds under a contract with Big Sky. Bimini’s fleet consists of Cessna 402s and Caravans, Piper Navajos, and Fairchild Metroliners. Also listed on its site is the Saab 340 but it is unclear whether that is used in its passenger or charter operations.