Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT9D-7 Series Turbofan Engines. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the 2nd stage high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor and stator assembly. This AD results from an uncontained failure of a 2nd stage HPT rotor disk that caused the engine to separate from the airplane. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the 2nd stage HPT rotor disk, which could result in uncontained engine failure, damage to the airplane, and the engine separating from the airplane. This AD becomes effective May 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) BR700-715A1-30, BR700-715B1-30, and BR700-715C1-30 Turbofan Engines. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It is necessary to change the limits of the High Pressure (HP) Turbine Stage 1 and Stage 2 Rotor Discs. The maximum approved life of these discs is decreased for all flight missions. This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) has been raised to instruct mandatory decreased maximum approved lives in the BR715 Time Limits Manual (TLM) T-715-3BR for the HP Turbine Stage 1 Rotor Disc for both Part No. BRH20130 and Part No. BRH20131 and of the High Pressure (HP) Turbine Stage 2 Rotor Disc for both Part No. BRH19423 and Part No. BRH19427 for all flight missions. The life limits are decreased by the same proportion for all flight missions, thus back to birth pro-rata calculations due to the life limit changes are not necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent rotating parts that may have exceeded their low-cycle fatigue life limits from failing, which could result in uncontained engine failure and subsequent damage to the airplane. This AD becomes effective April 27, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Hawker Beechcraft Corporation Model MU-300-10 and Model 400 and 400A; and Raytheon (Mitsubishi) Model MU-300. Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain BEECH Model 400, 400A, and MU-300-10 airplanes. That AD currently requires installation of an improved adjustment mechanism on the flightcrew seats and replacement of the existing aluminum seat reinforcement assemblies with steel assemblies. This new AD would add airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from reports of incomplete latching of the existing adjustment mechanism and cracked reinforcement assemblies, which could result in sudden shifting of a flightcrew seat. We are issuing this AD to prevent sudden shifting of a flightcrew seat, which could impair the flightcrew's ability to control the airplane. This AD becomes effective April 30, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires modifying the auxiliary hydraulic power system (including doing all applicable related investigative and corrective actions). This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, as well as reports of shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence of arcing on the power cables of the auxiliary hydraulic pump. We are issuing this AD to prevent shorted wires or electrical arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in a fire in the wheel well; and to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD becomes effective May 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; ATR Model ATR72. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Incomplete accomplishment instructions in SB [service bulletin] ATR72-27-1059 original issue and Revision 1, failed to mention installation of cotter pins to secure the self locking nuts after re-installation of the modified Pitch Uncoupling Mechanism (PUM), when connecting the elevator control linkage rods to the PUM input levers and the PUM output rods to the elevator bellcranks (on both sides). Because of the non-installation of these four cotter pins, the fail-safe criteria of the design requirements on the pitch control are no longer met. Such a failure could cause the loss of one self locking nut and would result in the loss of pitch control on one side-Captain or First Officer-or the loss of control of one elevator surface. The symmetrical loss of two concerned self-locking nuts could lead to a complete loss of the pitch control. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. This AD becomes effective May 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Hamilton Sundstrand Propellers Model 568F Propellers Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: This AD requires removing affected propeller blades from service for rework. This AD results from reports of blades with corrosion pits in the tulip area of the blades. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks from developing in the tulip area of the blade, which could result in separation of the blade and loss of airplane control. This AD becomes effective May 1, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires modifying the wire installation of the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG). This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent a tire burst when the MLG is in the retracted position from causing damage to the wire assembly of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and subsequent electrical arcing, creating the potential of an ignition source to the center wing tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD is effective May 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA-46-350P and PA-46R-350T Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires you to inspect the 35-amp and 250-amp current limiters to verify they are installed in the proper locations and correct the installation if the current limiters are not installed in the proper locations. This AD also limits operation to ''only under day visual flight rules (VFR)'' until the current limiter installation is inspected and corrected. This AD results from three reports of incorrectly installed current limiters. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct incorrect installation of 35-amp and 250-amp current limiters, which could result in failure of the 35-amp current limiter if installed in the 250-amp location. This failure could lead to a total loss of electrical power. This AD becomes effective on May 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company CF6-80A Series Turbofan Engines Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80A series turbofan engines with a high-pressure turbine rotor (HPTR) stage 1 disk, part number (P/N) 9367M45G06, installed. This AD requires removing any HPTR stage 1 disk, P/N 9367M45G06, before exceeding 2,075 cycles-since-new (CSN). This AD results from an error by GE that incorrectly cited a cyclic life of 12,600 CSN for the HPTR stage 1 disk, P/N 9367M45G06. We are issuing this AD to prevent the HPTR stage 1 disk from exceeding its part life, which could cause fatigue cracks to start and grow. These cracks could result in a possible uncontained disk failure and damage to the airplane. This AD becomes effective May 6, 2009.