18th Meeting: RTCA Special Committee 206/EUROCAE WG 76 Plenary. The FAA is issuing this notice to advise the public of a meeting of RTCA Special Committee 206: Aeronautical Information Services and Meteorology Data Link Services. The meeting will be held September 14-18, 2009 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. at World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 7bis, avenue de la Paix, Case postale No. 2300, CH-1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: In Geneva: Herbert Puempel, tel.: +41.22.730.82.83, Chief, Aeronautical Meteorology Unit (C/AEM), email: hpuempel@wmo.int, Bridgette Vuitteney-Gelman, email: BVuitteney-Gelman@wmo.in, Andrew Mirza, tel.: +44(0)1392 884108, e-mail: andrew.mirza@metoffice.gov.uk, Met Office, FitzRoy Road, Exeter, EX1 3PB, United Kingdom.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-301, -321, -322, -341, and -342, and Airbus Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313. Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During accomplishment of A330-300 Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI) task 57.11.04-01-02 of a fastener hole between stringer 38 and 39 at FR40 rear fitting web, a crack was found on an adjacent hole at vertical post Y1959 lower attachment on both sides. Other crack findings on this adjacent hole have been reported on A330-300 and A340-200/-300 aircraft as a result of sampling inspections. If not corrected, crack propagation could result in loss of the fuselage structural integrity. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 5, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as. In 2005 a lateral runway excursion occurred on an A320 aircraft. Such excursions are classified as hazardous, with a large reduction in safety margins. Investigation has shown that the aircraft landed with the nose wheels rotated nearly 20 degrees from center. During subsequent tests on the removed BSCU [Braking and Steering Control Unit], a BSCU hardware failure was found, affecting the monitoring function, including the system reconfiguration management, and leading to a runaway of [the] Nose Wheel Steering [uncommanded steering]. The unsafe condition is an uncommanded steering condition during takeoff or landing, which could result in departure of the airplane from the runway. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 25, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been a number of incidents where wing-to-fuselage or MLG [main landing gear] door fairing panels have detached from the aircraft during flight. Subsequent inspection revealed the loss of the fairing panels to be due to failure of certain steel grommets. A detaching panel could strike the aircraft during flight, causingdamage. In addition, a detaching panel could become attached to the structure or control surfaces, resulting in reduced control of the aircraft. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 25, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) Model EMB-120, -120ER, -120FC, -120QC, and -120RT. Final rule. SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It was found one occurrence of a fuel booster pump circuit br[e]aker opening during an engine maintenance servicing. An inspection inside the fuel tank revealed the fuel booster pump[']s electrical harness chafing against its body, causing the loss of the electrical wiring protection and resulting in a short circuit. Further in-tank inspections have shown other fuel booster pump electrical harnesses chafing either with the pump body and/or with adjacent fuel lines, causing damage to the harness protective layers and resulting [in a] possible ignition source inside the fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 2, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D. Final rule. SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and - 400D series airplanes. This AD requires installing new relays to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the in-flight entertainment (IFE) system and other non- essential passenger cabin systems through the left and right utility bus switches, and other specified actions. This AD results from an IFE systems review. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-essential passenger cabin systems through utility bus switches in the flight compartment, in the event of smoke or fumes. The flightcrew's inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non-essential passenger cabin systems could result in the inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation. DATES: This AD is effective August 25, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Model 427. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by the aviation authority of Canada to identify and correct an unsafemcondition on an aviation product. Transport Canada, the aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states that it has been determined that the existing hardware connecting the vertical fin to the tail rotor gearbox needs to be upgraded to prevent the vertical fin from becoming loose. BHTC has received reports of loose vertical fins discovered during inspections. Investigation revealed that the current vertical fin attachment hardware may not provide adequate clamp-up. If not corrected, the vertical fin could become loose and cause vibration, which could lead to subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD requires actions that are intended to address this unsafe condition. DATES: This AD becomes effective on September 8, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146-100A and 146-200A. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd has determined that in order to assure the continued structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer lower skin and joint plates in the rib 1 area of certain BAe 146 aircraft, a revised inspection programme for this area is considered necessary. The disbonding of joints can lead to corrosion which, if undetected, could result in degradation of the structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 2, 2009.

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 707 Airplanes and Model 720 and 720B. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires performing an operational test of the engine fuel suction feed of the fuel system, and other related testing and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of in-service occurrences of loss of fuel system suction feed capability, followed by total loss of pressure of the fuel feed system. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct failure of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which could result in multi-engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 25, 2009.