A California judge has ruled that air traffic controllers at Torrance Municipal Airport/Zamperini Field (TOA) made mistakes, were negligent and primarily responsible for the November 6, 2003 midair collision of two helicopters in front of the airport's control tower. The ruling contradicts the National...
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A California judge has ruled that air traffic controllers at Torrance Municipal Airport/Zamperini Field (TOA) made mistakes, were negligent and primarily responsible for the November 6, 2003 midair collision of two helicopters in front of the airport's control tower. The ruling contradicts the National Transportation Safety Board, which determined that pilot error caused the fatal accident.
US District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper ruled that TOA tower controllers made a series of incorrect and negligent decisions that led to the crash, which killed two pilots onboard a Robinson R-44. A student pilot, who was making a solo flight in a Robinson R-22 Beta II survived the crash, but suffered severe injuries. A ruling on damages is expected later this year.
"Whether it's a jumbo jet that seats hundreds or a two-seater helicopter, pilots must be able to trust the information air traffic controllers relay to them," says James Pocrass of Pocrass, Heimanson & Wolf of Los Angeles and co-plaintiff attorney for Gavin Heyworth. "In this case, the recording of the taped instructions clearly shows two confused traffic controllers not communicating with each other and giving inaccurate instructions to the pilots that culminated in the death of two people and in the third receiving severe life-long injuries."
Pocrass said the court ruled that the tower controllers were negligent for the crash due to a series of errors made while the helicopters were in controlled air space.
To begin with, the Control Tower was short one controller for the day. When the fateful incident began, one controller of the three in the tower had gone on break, leaving one controller in charge of both runways and in charge of all the air traffic around the airport, communicating on two different frequencies.
Recognizing that the controller on duty needed help, the Controller in Charge called the controller on break back early. However, they failed to coordinate with each other and to perform a mandated Position Relief Briefing, said Pocrass.
Torrance Airport is the home of Robinson Helicopter. FAA controllers are well accustomed to coordinating and working with the relatively large number of helicopter training flights that take place there on a regular basis.
However, said Pocrass, "on this day, the controllers became enormously confused, giving the two helicopters a series of instructions, including some that violated their duties under specific air traffic control orders, that placed the helicopters on a collision course."
The crash occurred directly in front of the control tower. Neither pilot could see the other because each helicopter was in the other pilot's "blind spot." In fact, only the controllers in the tower had the vantage point to be able to see both aircraft and their relationship to each other. Yet for 18 seconds just prior to the crash, the recording is silent, with no warnings of the other's existence coming to either aircraft from the two controllers, Pocrass successfully argued.
The judge's ruling runs counter to the NTSB's probe of the fatal small helicopter accident issued in May 2007.
According to Safety Board investigators, the R22 pilot did not broadcast that he was a student pilot, and the controller did not think that the R22 pilot was a student pilot based on the quality of his radio transmissions. The R22 pilot had been practicing at a helipad north of runway 29R, and was returning to his parking area on the ramp south of runway 29L.
The R44 pilot was departing from runway 29L on a touch-and-go. The R22 was above the R44, and descending to the southwest while the R44 was climbing straight ahead on runway 29L at the time of the collision.
A tower controller instructed the R22 pilot to hold when he requested to go from the helipad to parking. After traffic passed, the controller advised him that he could proceed in right traffic flying a downwind traffic pattern for runway 29R to the helipad. The R22 pilot requested takeoff to land at his parking area. The controller instructed him to fly westbound. A few seconds later, the controller cleared the R44 pilot for the touch-and-go option on runway 29L, and in the same transmission cleared the R22 pilot to make a right turn to the downwind on runway 29R.
About 45 seconds later, the controller informed the R22 pilot that he could expect a clearance to cross midfield when the controller got a chance. About 20 seconds later, the controller instructed the R22 pilot to turn right. About 30 seconds after that, he cleared the R22 pilot to land on runway 29R; the R22 pilot acknowledged about five seconds later with his call sign. The controller immediately transmitted for him to turn right, and cleared him to land on runway 29R.
There was no further communication from the R22 pilot. The R22 was still in a position to turn and land on runway 29R. It began a right turn, but then instead of landing on the runway, it crossed 29R and continued descending toward 29L at a continuously reducing angle. The controller had looked away to work other traffic. As he turned to inform the R44 of the R22 landing on the parallel runway, he observed the collision.
Reconstruction of the collision geometry placed the R22 above and slightly forward of the R44, and on a similar track. Based on a visibility study, once the R22 pilot turned toward his pad while he was north of runway 29R, he was not in a position to see the R44. During the takeoff, the R44 pilot was not in a position to see the R22 prior to impact.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the fatal accident was the student pilot's failure to comply with an ATC clearance.
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