Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an...
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Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were then assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. The assessment showed that it is necessary to introduce Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), in order to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features during configuration changes such as modifications and repairs, or during maintenance actions. Failure to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion.
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800 and -900 Series Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD requires inspecting ground blocks GD261 and GD264 for corrosion, measuring the electrical bond resistance between the ground blocks and the airplane structure, separating the ground wires for the fuel boost pump circuit between ground blocks GD261 and GD264, and doing corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of random flashes of the six fuel pump low pressure lights and intermittent operation of the fuel boost pumps. We are issuing this AD to prevent the simultaneous malfunction of all six fuel boost pumps, which could cause the engines to operate on suction feed and potentially flame out.
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series Airplanes. Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A number of occurrences of an incorrect installation of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA) have been found and reported during the accomplishment of the AIRBUS Service Bulletin (SB) A320-27-1164 mandated by EASA AD 2006-0223. These issues could lead to a degradation of the integrity of the THSA primary load path and to secondary load path partial or full engagement. Degradation of the THSA primary load path could result in latent (undetected) loading and eventual failure of the THSA secondary load path, with consequent uncontrolled movement of the horizontal stabilizer
Airworthiness Directives; Taylorcraft, Inc. Models A, B, and F Series Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Taylorcraft, Inc. Models A, B, and F series airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the wing strut attach fittings for corrosion or cracks and requires repair or replacement if corrosion or cracks are found. This AD results from data collected from an accident involving a Taylorcraft Model BF12-65 airplane. The wing separated from the airplane after the wing strut attach fitting failed due to corrosion. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion or cracks in the wing strut attach fittings, which could result in failure of the wing strut attach fittings and lead to wing separation and loss of control.
Airworthiness Directives; De Havilland Support Limited Model Beagle B.121 Series 1, 2, and 3 Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The Type Certificate Holder (TCH) has received several reports of failed Rudder torque tube assemblies. The torque tube assemblies are subject to repetitive inspection in accordance with Airworthiness Directive 2060 PRE 80. The recent failures occurred in service after the inspections required by AD 2060 PRE 80 had been performed. In the event of such failures, loss of directional control through both the Rudder and Nosewheel Steering may occur. The TCH has also received reports of loose rivets attaching the inboard Anchor Assembly to the Starboard Torque Tube.
Airworthiness Directives; Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA), Model CN-235, CN-235-100, CN-235-200, CN-235-300, and C-295 Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * *and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System * * * Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' * * *. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model DHC-8-400, DHC-8-401, and DHC-8-402 Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were then assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. The assessment showed that it is necessary to introduce Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), in order to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features during configuration changes such as modifications and repairs, or during maintenance actions. Failure to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion.
Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter France Model EC120B Helicopters Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on a helicopter. The aviation authority of France, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) follows upon the discovery of a batch of spherical thrust bearings which prove to be unfit for flight. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition caused by the manufacture of a batch of spherical thrust bearings that are not airworthy because they were not manufactured in accordance with an approved type design. Failure of a spherical thrust bearing during flight could cause the main rotor (M/R) system to separate from the helicopter, which would be catastrophic.
Airworthiness Directives; Cessna Aircraft Company 172, 175, 180, 182, 185, 206, 207, 208, 210, and 303 Series Airplanes Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: This AD requires inspection of the alternate static air source selector valve to assure that the part number identification placard does not obstruct the alternate static air source selector valve port. If the part number identification placard obstructs the port, this AD requires you to remove the placard, assure that the port is unobstructed, and report to the FAA if obstruction is found. This AD results from reports of improper installation of the part number identification placard on the alternate static air source selector valve. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent erroneous indications from the altimeter, airspeed, and vertical speed indicators, which could cause the pilot to react to incorrect flight information and possibly result in loss of control.
Airworthiness Directives; Bell Helicopter Textron Model 204B, 205A, 205A-1, 205B, 210, 212, 412, 412CF, and 412EP Helicopters Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) model helicopters. This action requires certain checks and inspections of each tail rotor blade assembly (T/R blade) at specified intervals and repairing or replacing, as applicable, any unairworthy T/R blade. This amendment is prompted by three failures of a T/R blade occurring during flight and a recent incident of a cracked T/R blade discovered during a scheduled visual inspection. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect damage to a T/R blade that could lead to cracking of a T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Model Avro 146-RJ Airplanes Final rule. SUMMARY: This AD results from service history of incidents and accidents involving transport category turbojet airplanes without leading edge high lift devices. This service history shows that even small amounts of frost, ice, snow, or slush on the wing leading edges or forward upper wing surfaces can cause an adverse change in the stall speeds and stall characteristics, and can negate the protection provided by a stall protection system. While there have been no accidents or incidents related to wing contamination associated with the BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Model Avro 146-RJ airplanes, these airplanes are also transport category turbojet airplanes without leading edge high lift devices, and therefore may be similarly sensitive to small amounts of wing contamination. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual to include a new cold weather operations limitation. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible loss of control on takeoff resulting from even small amounts of frost, ice, snow, or slush on the wing leading edges or forward upper wing surfaces. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe conditions of these products.
Advisory Circular Fatigue Management Programs for Airplanes with Demonstrated Risk of Catastrophic Failure Due to Fatigue. This advisory circular (AC) provides guidance on developing and implementing a Fatigue Management Program (FMP). An applicant may develop an FMP as one method to address the unsafe condition that arises when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has determined an airplane type design has a demonstrated risk of catastrophic failure due to fatigue (hereinafter referred to as demonstrated risk). An FMP incorporates damage-tolerance based inspections or a part replacement/modification program to mitigate the demonstrated risk. An FMP also incorporates inspections based on service history and engineering judgment to address the broader risk posed by potential cracking of other fatigue critical structure in the airplane. The FAA may mandate an FMP by Airworthiness Directive (AD) only in cases in which the FAA has determined that airworthiness action is necessary to address an unsafe condition. The FAA may also approve an FMP as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to an AD.
Airworthiness Directives; Przedsiebiorstwo Doswiadczalno- Produkcyjne Szybownictwa "PZL-Bielsko'' Model SZD-50-3 "Puchacz'' Gliders Final rule. SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: On the pre-flight check of a SZD-50-3 glider, the Right Hand (RH) wing airbrake was found impossible to retract. Investigation revealed that the occurrence was caused by a loose bolt of the "V'' shape airbrake bellcrank, named hereafter intermediate control lever. The Left Hand (LH) wing lever also presented, to a lesser extent, a loose bolt.
Crewmember and Dispatcher Training Programs Final rule; technical amendment. SUMMARY: The FAA is issuing this technical amendment to reserve subparts BB and CC in 14 CFR part 121. The FAA is engaged in rulemaking and anticipates codifying the new regulations in part 121 subparts BB and CC. DATE: This rule is effective on [INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE Federal Register]. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cindy Nordlie, Office of Rulemaking, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267-9677.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION Discussion: The FAA is engaged in rulemaking to revise regulations for crewmember and dispatcher training programs in domestic, flag, and supplemental operations. The FAA anticipates codifying the revised training regulations for crewmembers in subpart BB of part 121 and regulations for dispatchers in subpart CC of part 121. The FAA is issuing this technical amendment to reserve subparts BB and CC in 14 CFR part 121 to ensure that these subparts will be available for this future rulemaking.
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