APA Wants 'Realistic' Work Scheduling

The Allied Pilots Association (APA), which represents pilots at American Airlines, has called on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish "new, realistic scheduling and crew augmentation regulations to combat fatigue and maintain safety-based flight operations." APA President Captain...

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The Allied Pilots Association (APA), which represents pilots at American Airlines, has called on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish "new, realistic scheduling and crew augmentation regulations to combat fatigue and maintain safety-based flight operations."

APA President Captain Lloyd Hill says "pilots continue to be subjected to unrealistic scheduling by air carriers. It is imperative that the FAA take steps to reduce fatigue in the cockpit and provide a greater margin of safety for the traveling public."

According to the union boss, there is "considerable confusion" over how carriers apply duty-time regulations. "The FAA needs to clarify existing regulations governing realistic scheduling, and it must also begin the process of crafting new regulations to reflect our greater understanding of the link between duty time and pilot fatigue," Hill added.

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) also says the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) findings in the Shuttle America landing accident in Cleveland, OH makes it clear that pilot fatigue persists as a significant aviation safety risk.

The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of a Shuttle America Embraer ERJ- 170 accident earlier this year was the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable.

On February 18, Delta Connection Flight 6448, operated by Shuttle America, was landing on Runway 28 at Cleveland-Hopkins International during snow conditions when it overran the end of the runway, contacted an instrument landing system (ILS) antenna, and struck an airport perimeter fence.

Contributing to the accident was the crew's decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude. Because the flight crewmembers were advised that the glideslope was unusable, they should not have executed the approach to ILS minimums; instead, they should have set up, briefed, and accomplished the approach to localizer (glideslope out) minimums.

Also contributing to the accident was the first officer's long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew's failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness. When the first officer lost sight of the runway just before landing, he should have abandoned the landing attempt and immediately executed a missed approach.

Furthermore, the NTSB said that had the flight crew used the reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness, the airplane would likely have stopped before the end of the runway.

The Safety Board concluded that specific training for pilots in applying maximum braking and maximum reverse thrust on contaminated runways until a safe stop is ensured would reinforce the skills needed to successfully accomplish such landings.

In its final report on the accident investigation, the Safety Board noted that the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing, contributed to the accident.

By not advising Shuttle America of this fatigue or removing himself from duty, the captain placed himself, his crew, and his passengers in a dangerous situation that could have been avoided, the Board reasoned.

Another contributing factor to the accident, the Safety Board said, was Shuttle America's failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals.

The NTSB believes the policy had limited effectiveness because the specific details of the policy were not documented in writing and were not clearly communicated to pilots, especially the administrative implications or consequences of calling in as fatigued.

ALPA says solutions must include changing corporate cultures so that they seek to partner with, not punish, airline pilots for expressing fatigue concerns.

"Whether pilots are being pushed into sacrificing needed rest to help airlines deal with inadequate staffing or the strain of today's economic uncertainty has taken a toll on pilots' personal health, fatigue is escalating among airline pilots," says ALPA.

ALPA maintains that, while the current federal aviation flight- and duty-time limits for airline pilots are severely outdated, a modern regulatory environment is only part of the solution to address pilot fatigue.