The FAA, at American Airline's request, has extended the Aviation Safety Action Partnership program (ASAP) by 90 days. Temporary reprieve was granted as an expedient while airline executives and union officials continue to bicker over how to fairly administer the program. ASAP has been around since 1994. It...
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The FAA, at American Airline's request, has extended the Aviation Safety Action Partnership program (ASAP) by 90 days. Temporary reprieve was granted as an expedient while airline executives and union officials continue to bicker over how to fairly administer the program. ASAP has been around since 1994. It allows pilots to report safety-related issues, without fear of disciplinary action by the FAA or repercussions from the airline. That immunity includes situations where a pilot was at fault. The program has been imperiled by claims from the Allied Pilots Association that the company has been disciplining pilots against the spirit of the program. That, they argue, has made pilots wary of participating, and could eventually increase the chances of safety breakdowns due to non-reporting. The main sticking point seems to be incidents that surface due to reports by other than flight-crews (cabin staff, groundcrew, ATC). The company feels that such avenues open the door to punitive action if a pilot is consciously (or evidently, or suspected of) avoiding any follow-up through his filing of such a report.
The Federal Aviation Administration said there is no safety problem with wing flap doors on Boeing 737-400s, despite three emergency landings last month by Alaska Airlines planes. The agency said it's still working with Boeing Co. (BA) and the airline to eliminate problems with the doors that prevented the trailing wing flaps to fully extend before landing. An airline spokesperson revealed that those doors have been removed from all 40 of Alaskan's 737-400s. She says they'll be reinstalled after the problem is identified. FAA spokesman Allen Kenitzer said the planes can fly without the wing flap doors, because their purpose is simply to increase fuel efficiency by decreasing drag.
Ever since President Bush nominated Bobby Sturgell to take over Marion Blakey's job as head of the FAA, his nomination has been controversial, with most of the established user groups (including NBAA, AOPA, and EAA) willing to work with him, but an assortment of noisy advocacy groups, as well as NATCA, firmly opposed. Constituents in the North-East who are unhappy with the FAA's ongoing redesign of busy airspace in the region (and therefore opposed to Sturgell) have been lobbying their Senators to oppose his nomination. But finally, on 07 Feb, Sturgell at last got to commence his hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 108--Mitsubishi MU-2B Series Airplane Special Training, Experience, and Operating Requirements; Final Rule: see the [now published] rule at tinyurl.com/34uvpe
Extract: "Benefits of This Rule:
We estimate the final rule will provide benefits of $76.0 million ($49.3 million in present value) from 2008 through 2017. In the absence
of the requirements contained in this final rule, future accidents will occur on MU-2B airplanes in a manner similar to what has happened in the past. A key benefit of the final rule will be the avoidance of these accidents."
Aircraft
Effect
Special Conditions No. 25-366-SC 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes as modified by ABX Air Inc
At present, there is limited experience with use of rechargeable lithium ion batteries in applications involving commercial aviation. However, other users of this technology, ranging from wireless telephone manufacturers to the electric vehicle industry, have noted safety problems with lithium ion batteries. Problems include overcharging, over-discharging, and flammability of cell components. [comments reqstd by 10 March] 1. Overcharging: In general, lithium ion batteries are significantly more susceptible to internal failures that can result in self-sustaining increases in temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. This is especially true for overcharging that causes heating and destabilization of the components of the cell, leading to the formation (by plating) of highly unstable metallic lithium. The metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining fire or explosion. Finally, the severity of thermal runaway due to overcharging increases with increasing battery capacity due to the higher amount of electrolyte in large batteries. 2. Over-Discharging: Discharge of some types of lithium ion batteries beyond a certain voltage (typically 2.4 volts) can cause corrosion of the electrodes of the cell, resulting in loss of battery capacity that cannot be reversed by recharging. This loss of capacity may not be detected by the simple voltage measurements commonly available to flight crews as a means of checking battery status--a problem shared with nickel-cadmium batteries. 3. Flammability of Cell Components Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid batteries, some types of lithium ion batteries use liquid electrolytes that are flammable. The electrolyte can serve as a source of fuel for an external fire, if there is a breach of the battery container. These problems experienced by users of lithium ion batteries raise concern about the use of these batteries in commercial aviation. Accordingly, the proposed use of lithium ion batteries in a satellite communication system on Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes has prompted the FAA to review the adequacy of existing regulations in 14 CFR 25. Our review indicates that the existing regulations do not adequately address several failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics of lithium ion batteries.
AD 2008-03-13 ATR42-500
FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR Model ATR42-500 series airplanes. This AD requires removing metallized polyethylene terephtalate (MPET) insulation blankets installed on the left and the right sides of the airplane over frame 24 between stringers 5 and 14. This AD results from reports indicating that burnt spots were found on the MPET insulation blankets installed over frame 24. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that MPET insulation blankets are removed over frame 24. Such MPET insulation blankets, if not removed, could propagate a small fire that is the result of an electrical arc and could lead to a much larger fire. Final Rule eff 20 Feb
AD 2008-03-16 Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Models SR20 and SR22
AD requires inspection of the rudder, aileron, and rudder-aileron interconnect rigging; correcting any out-of-rig condition; replacing the attaching hardware for the rudder-aileron interconnect arm; and reporting any out-of-rig condition found. AD results from a jamming of the aileron and rudder controls on a Model SR20 airplane, which resulted in loss of rudder and aileron flight control. AD is to prevent the possibility of jamming of the rudder-aileron interconnect system, which may result in loss of rudder and aileron flight controls. Final rule eff 11 March
2007-NM-304-AD ERJ 170 and ERJ190
Proposed AD would add additional airplanes to the applicability and would require the AFM revision for those additional airplanes. For certain airplanes, this proposed AD would also require installing new, improved full-authority digital engine-control (FADEC) software. This proposed AD results from a report that, during landing, the thrust reverser may not re-stow completely if the throttle lever is moved into the forward thrust range immediately after the thrust reverser is applied. AD is to prevent the flightcrew from performing a takeoff with a partially deployed thrust reverser, which could result in reduced controllability
2007-NM-289-AD Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 50
AD is issued following the discovery of a risk of chafing between an electrical feeder bundle and a bus bar under the circuit breaker panel. Most of the time, this possible chafing would be dormant and would lead to an uneventful loss of segregation within the different electrical system components. However, missing segregation combined with additional electrical failures may impair flight safety. Chafing between an electrical feeder bundle and a bus bar under the circuit breaker panel could lead to electrical arcing, which could result in smoke and fire in the cockpit. NPRM comments required by 06 Mar
2007-NM-273-AD Fokker F-70 and Fokker F-100
Leakage of hot wing anti-icing air from the Peri-seal housing. This results in an uncontrolled flow of high-pressure hot air to enter the forward (anti-icing) plenum chamber of the wing leading edge, potentially damaging the anti-icing barrier webs. Subsequently, the wing auxiliary spar can also be damaged by high-pressure hot air. Deterioration of the Peri-seals enables the piccolo tubes to vibrate, resulting in a broken piccolo tube. This condition, if not corrected, may cause heat damage to the front spar that potentially affects the wing's load capability. NPRM comments required by 06 Mar
2007-NM-327-AD Gulfstream G150
Chafing between [the] electrical feeder cable connected to contactor 123P/2 and ground point 803GND, installed within the left DC power box, was discovered during routine receiving inspection. This condition may exist on boxes installed on in-service aircraft. If this chafing condition is left unattended, an electrical short may develop, leading to disconnection of the battery and battery bus from the electrical system of the aircraft, [which could result in] overheating, arcing, smoke and fire. NPRM comments required by 06 Mar
2007-NM-240-AD SAAB 2000
One LM-219-92 Centre Bracket from an LM-219-SA28 Aft Engine Mounting assembly was found to be cracked while installed on the aircraft. This reduces the effectiveness of the mounting assembly and could eventually cause it to fail. A failed mounting assembly, if not corrected, could result in loss of the engine. NPRM comments required by 06 Mar
AD 2008-03-09 CFM56-7B Series Turbofan Engines
Adds mandatory inspections of certain low pressure turbine rear frames (TRFs) to the ALS or CAMP. This AD results from a refined lifing analysis by the engine manufacturer that shows the need to identify an initial threshold for inspecting certain TRFs. AD is to prevent failure of the TRF from low-cycle fatigue cracks. Failure of the TRF could result in engine separation from the airplane. Final rule eff 10 Mar
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