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Monday, January 14, 2008

Significant Regulatory Activity

A proposal dated 2 January addresses auxiliary fuel tanks made by Southeast Aero-Tek, one of three manufacturers that have built such systems for VIP conversions. Florida-based Aero-Tek holds STCs for the Boeing 727 as well as several models of the DC-9. Based on Aero-Tek's self-funded analysis, the FAA...

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A proposal dated 2 January addresses auxiliary fuel tanks made by Southeast Aero-Tek, one of three manufacturers that have built such systems for VIP conversions. Florida-based Aero-Tek holds STCs for the Boeing 727 as well as several models of the DC-9. Based on Aero-Tek's self-funded analysis, the FAA determined that the company must install a transient suppression device (TSD) in the fuel quantity indication system and the "float level switch" in the auxiliary tanks of 37 US-registered aircraft to prevent any possibility of high voltages travelling into the tanks. In October, the FAA proposed a nearly identical rule for California-based Rogerson Aircraft, which holds auxiliary fuel tank STCs for a variety of classic Boeing jets, among other VIP air carrier aircraft. Thirty-nine US-registered aircraft will require the modifications, although Rogerson no longer supplies the auxiliary fuel systems and is not working on fixes to the design. In both cases, the FAA says the manufacturer has not provided some or all of the service information required under SFAR 88, forcing the regulator to "mandate the deactivation" of the fuel tanks. While time is available to make appropriate fixes before the deadline, key manufacturers of the systems have either left the business or have not had modification packages approved by the FAA. In consequence, operators of as many as 75 US-registered corporate airliners may be forced to deactivate their auxiliary fuel systems by mid-December under new fuel tank safety rules.
Aircraft Effect
AD 2007-23-12 707 Airplanes and Model 720 and 720B Series Airplanes The FAA is correcting an error in an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that was published in the Federal Register on November 13, 2007 (72 FR 63800). The error resulted in the wrong appendix information. This AD applies to all Boeing Model 707 airplanes and Model 720 and 720B series airplanes. This AD requires accomplishing an airplane survey to define the configuration of certain system installations, and repair of any discrepancy found. This AD also requires modifying the fuel system by installing lightning protection for the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS), ground fault relays for the fuel boost pumps, and additional power relays for the center tank fuel pumps and uncommanded on-indication lights at the flight engineer's panel. Final Rule eff 10 Jan
AD 2008-01-03 Learjet Model 45 AD requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the airplane maintenance manual to incorporate certain inspections and compliance times to detect fatigue cracking of certain principal structural elements (PSEs). This AD results from new and more restrictive life limits and inspection intervals for certain PSEs. AD is to ensure that fatigue cracking of various PSEs is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes. Final Rule eff 14 Feb
2007-NM-157-AD 737-300 and -400 Proposed AD would require testing and inspecting a certain web panel of the main wheel well pressure deck to determine the material type and thickness; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD results from several reports indicating that cracks ranging from 0.8 to 8.0 inches long were found on a certain web panel of the main wheel well pressure deck. AD is to prevent fatigue cracking in the web panel of the main wheel well pressure deck, which could result in venting and consequent rapid decompression. NPRM Comments required by 25 Feb
2007-NM-183-AD 777 Proposed AD would require an inspection to determine the manufacturer and manufacture date of the oxygen masks in the center and outboard passenger service units (PSUs), crew rests, and lavatory and flight attendant oxygen boxes. AD would also require related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. Proposed AD results from a report that several passenger masks with broken in-line flow indicators were found following a mask deployment. AD is to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event. NPRM Comments required by 25 Feb
2007-NM-282-AD A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 One A320 operator has reported a disbond on the composite rudder control rod. Investigations conducted by the supplier revealed that this disbond is due to an incorrect low volume of resin in the fiber composite. The supplier and Airbus have confirmed that some rudder control rods installed on A330 and A340-200/-300 aircraft before delivery or delivered as spares are also affected by this defect. Rudder control rod rupture can lead, in the worst case, in combination with a yaw damper runaway, to an unsafe condition. NPRM Comments required by 11 Feb
2007-NM-252-AD F27 Mark 050 and Model F.28 Mark 0100 Recently, a Fokker 100 (F28 Mark 0100) operator noted that the electrical connectors of the PSUs (Passenger Service Units) did not lock properly during installation in the aircraft. The PSU panels installed in Fokker 50 (F27 Mark 050 and Mark 0502) aircraft are similar to those installed in the Fokker 100. Investigation revealed that the lack of locking is caused by the tolerance in thickness of the gaskets (seals) inside the PSU connectors. This condition, if not corrected, may cause the connector to overheat, leading to electrical arcing and subsequent failure of the PSU Panels. In such instances, smoke is likely to be emitted. NPRM Comments required by 11 Feb
2007-NM-271-AD A318/ A319/ A320/ A321 Existing AD currently requires a one-time inspection of the horizontal hinge pin of the 103VU electrical panel in the avionics compartment to determine if the hinge pin can move out of the hinge, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This proposed AD would require installing a hinge pin stopper on the internal door of the 103VU electrical panel. This proposed AD results from a report indicating that electrical wire damage was found in the 103VU electrical panel due to contact between the hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness. AD is to prevent contact between the horizontal hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness, which could result in damage to electrical wires, and consequent arcing and/or failure of associated systems. NPRM Comments required by 8 Feb
2007-NM-260-AD A318/ A319/ A320/ A321 Several cases of cracks on the main landing gear (MLG) door hinge fitting and MLG door actuator fitting on the keel beam were reported. Such failure could lead to the loss [of] the MLG door and could cause damage to the aircraft and/or hazard to persons or property on the ground. NPRM Comments required by 8 Feb
AD 2008-01-02 DHC4 Caribou During a heavy maintenance check on a DHC-4 aircraft, an operator discovered that both of the upper engine mount bracket assemblies on one aircraft were cracked. Further inspection of the operator's fleet confirmed that engine mount bracket assemblies on five out of ten aircraft were also cracked. Failure of the upper engine mount bracket assembly could result in separation of the engine from the airplane. Final Rule eff 7 Feb
AD 2007-26-18 BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ An accumulator cylinder had material defects and suffered an in-flight burst failure causing damage to the aircraft structure. To prevent the risk of further failures, this Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires all accumulators with cylinders from this supplier to be identified and inspected prior to re-installation. Final Rule eff 11 Feb
AD 2007-26-19 Tay Engines AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of all ice-impact panels and fillers in the low pressure (LP) compressor case for certain conditions and replacing, as necessary, any or all panels. This AD requires the same actions, provides terminating action to those repetitive actions, and adds the Tay 611-8C turbofan engine to the applicability. This AD results from RRD introducing new LP compressor case ice-impact panels with additional retention features to these Tay turbofan engines. AD is to prevent release of ice-impact panels due to improper bonding that can result in loss of thrust in both engines. Final Rule eff 11 Feb
2007-NM-341-AD CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440 Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards. Assessment showed that supplemental maintenance tasks [for certain bonding jumpers, wiring harnesses, and hydraulic systems, among other items] are required to prevent potential ignition sources inside the fuel system, which could result in a fuel tank explosion. NPRM Comments required by 4 Feb

 


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