Safety Board Issues More Recommendations for Lithium Batteries

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued two new recommendations regarding proper air transport of rechargeable lithium batteries, which are used in a variety of electronic equipment. The NTSB made the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of...

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The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued two new recommendations regarding proper air transport of rechargeable lithium batteries, which are used in a variety of electronic equipment.

The NTSB made the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA):

• In collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices, air travel associations, and other appropriate government and private organizations, establish a process to ensure wider, highly visible, and continuous dissemination of guidance and information to the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft. (A-08-1)
• In collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices, air travel associations, and other appropriate government and private organizations, establish a process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft. (A-08-2)

The two new Safety Board advisements result for the increasing number of accidents documented by the FAA involving overheating and fires initiated by secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries.

From February 2001 to February 2006, rechargeable lithium batteries were involved in four aviation accidents compared to one incident involving lithium batteries in the previous five-year period. And the NTSB noted that nine million rechargeable lithium batteries have been recalled since February 2006.

"Because of the steadily rising popularity of personal portable electronic devices, such as

laptop computers and cell phones, the number of rechargeable lithium batteries shipped individually or in electronic equipment will continue to rise, and the potential for a rechargeable lithium battery causing a fire on an aircraft will increase.

"Therefore, it is essential that the public and air carrier personnel are aware of the risks of lithium batteries and the recommended guidance and restrictions for carrying these items in their luggage and carry-on items," the NTSB stated.

"The Safety Board recalls the media campaign undertaken by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding the limitation of liquids in carry-on items. Signs and posters were prevalent in airports, and ticket agents and TSA personnel specifically asked passengers about liquids in their carry-on parcels.

"Rechargeable lithium batteries may not present a potential security risk like liquid carry-on items, but they do present a potential fire risk on board passenger aircraft. The Board is not aware of a widespread or recurrent media campaign effort being made to educate and inform the air-traveling public about the potential risks of rechargeable lithium batteries. Most air passengers and flight crews are likely unaware of the fire risks posed by rechargeable lithium batteries and the available guidance for their safe carriage on board passenger aircraft.

"The Safety Board concludes that public awareness initiatives of PHMSA, the FAA, ALPA, and the trade associations for air carriers and manufacturers of rechargeable lithium batteries and/or electronic devices are not reaching significant numbers of air passengers and flight crews and, therefore, are not having the necessary impact to increase awareness about the potential fire risks and safe carriage of rechargeable lithium batteries," the NTSB stated.

The Safety Board recommendations are the latest federal advisements/actions on the transport of lithium batteries on board aircraft. The DoT implemented new safety rules on January 1, stating passengers will no longer be able to pack loose lithium batteries in checked luggage.

The new regulation, designed to reduce the risk of lithium battery fires, will continue to allow lithium batteries in checked baggage if they are installed in electronic devices, or in carry-on baggage if stored in plastic bags.

In early December 2007, the NTSB issued safety recommendation calling for fire-suppression systems to be installed onboard all Part 121 cargo aircraft -- saying such systems may have prevented a United Parcel Service DC-8-71F from catching fire after landing and burning on Feb. 7, 2006 at Philadelphia International Airport.

UPS Flight 1307 made an emergency landing at PHL after the flight deck crew detected smoke in the cargo hold, which intensified as the plane descended. The freighter landed safely and the crew escaped with minor injuries, but the aircraft and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. Of concern is whether lithium batteries being carried onboard the UPS all-cargo plane played a key role in the in-flight fire.

The Safety Board's final report determined that the probable cause of the non-fatal accident was an in-flight fire that initiated from an unknown source within one of the containers in the main cargo compartment. The report concluded that the threat from cargo fires could be mitigated on all-cargo aircraft by the installation of fire suppression systems, which are only mandated for cargo holds of commercial passenger transports.

"While we may not know the source of the fire which caused this accident, our investigators have done an excellent job of highlighting possible solutions that will address hazards associated with in-flight fires," said NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker.

The NTSB said that given the length of time that the fire burned and the resulting destruction of potentially helpful evidence, the post-fire condition of the cargo containers and contents and the surrounding airplane structure provided no evidence that indicated what initiated the fire.

But the investigation revealed that several electronic devices containing secondary lithium batteries were onboard the airplane. Unfortunately, the lack of information about the batteries (the subject of recent safety recalls) prevented any determination of whether these batteries were the source of the on-board cargo hold fire.

Key conclusions from the NTSB investigation included:

• Flight crews on cargo-only aircraft remain at risk from in-flight fires involving both primary and secondary lithium batteries.
• Testing and incident data indicate that lithium batteries can pose a fire hazard.
• Because many incidents involving lithium batteries are exempt from reporting requirements, the data regarding such incidents are incomplete, which has prevented a thorough assessment of the causes of these failures and the risks associated with transporting lithium batteries.
• An in-depth analysis of the causes of secondary and primary lithium battery failures would improve the safe transportation of these batteries.

NTSB investigators have long felt that lithium batteries can present fire hazards due to the heat often generated when they are damaged or suffer a short circuit. There have been several lithium battery aviation incidents in recent years.

FAA testing revealed that bulk shipments of such batteries pose a significant fire hazard. And cargo shipments of certain types of lithium batteries remain banned from passenger aircraft under a final rule issued by the PHMSA last August.

Safety testing conducted by the FAA found that current aircraft cargo fire suppression systems (installed only in passenger transports) are not capable of suppressing a fire if a shipment of primary lithium batteries is ignited in flight.

The Safety Board said the PHMSA's August 2007 final rule regarding the transportation of lithium batteries did not establish sufficient levels of safety for air transportation of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium content).

The Safety Board made numerous recommendations to the PHMSA.

They included:

• Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft.
• Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, require that cargo shipments of secondary batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire suppression systems can be used.
• Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes.
• Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items.
• Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the packaging, marking, and labeling of cargo shipments of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium content) until the analysis of the failures and the implementation of risk-based requirements asked for in a safety recommendation are completed.