More Homeland Security Work Ahead

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff believes homeland security was improved in 2007, but warns that more needs to be done in 2008 if "catastrophic consequences" are to be avoided. Before the Woodrow Wilson Institute in mid-December, Chertoff said "2007 was, in...

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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff believes homeland security was improved in 2007, but warns that more needs to be done in 2008 if "catastrophic consequences" are to be avoided.

Before the Woodrow Wilson Institute in mid-December, Chertoff said "2007 was, in fact, a year of tremendous progress and maturation for this Department. From border security and immigration enforcement to passenger screening, critical infrastructure protection, and emergency response, we launched a number of important initiatives to strengthen our nation's security and we began to see the fruits of our labor in a number of vital areas.

"We also saw record numbers of air travelers at our airports, including more than 17 million travelers during the week of Thanksgiving. Despite this high volume, and the continued and necessary restrictions on liquids in carry-on baggage, peak wait times at the busiest airports rarely exceeded 13 minutes -- and in most places, were substantially lower.

"Now, I'm not going to tell you that we achieved perfection. No human effort is without error -- and we had our share of errors this year -- but we did learn, we matured, we challenged ourselves, and we grew stronger and more united as a department," Chertoff added.

He ticked off major initiates for 2007. Passenger Name Records---basically commercial data collected by the airlines--- has allowed DHS to identify scores of dangerous people and to keep them from entering the U.S. A new rule allows DHS to get Passenger Name Record information earlier from the airlines.

In order to better confirm identity and check visitors against watch lists, DHS in 2007 began taking 10 fingerprints. More than half of the U.S. consulates overseas now take all 10 fingerprints electronically as a precondition to giving a visa. U.S. airports will adopt the practice as well.

"Because of our capability to take 10 fingerprints, and the collection of latent fingerprints from battlefields and training camps and safehouses, we now have a much enhanced capability to identify the unknown terrorist; the person whose name we don't have on watch list, whose biographic information may not tip us off to the threat, but who has left a little piece of themselves somewhere and some place that suggests we ought to take a closer look," he said.

Last year, DHS proposed new rules to strengthen the security of general aviation aircraft entering the United States.

As part of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, DHS began requiring citizens of the U.S., Canada, Mexico and Bermuda to present a passport when arriving at U.S. airports.

And DHS proposed new regulations that will allow TSA to take over the control of domestic passenger watch lists under our Secure Flight program.

DHS is now deploying behavioral screening officers to more than 40 U.S. airports to identify potentially threatening passengers based on their behavior. "This program reflect our determination to move beyond the static, inflexible model of checkpoint screening to a more dynamic and multi-layered security environment that includes, apart from behavioral detection, such tools as whole body imaging, and a focus on improvised explosive devices. We'll be expanding this concept in 2008 because it's not enough to simply say we've avoided another hijacking on our aircraft since September 11th. We have to make sure we keep ahead of the enemy so we can continue to avoid those kinds of hijackings," Chertoff believes.

"Now when I hear people say the terrorist threat has diminished, or maybe we don't need to take it so seriously, or they're concerned that security is going to be inconvenient or it's going to cost too much, I have to say, these excuses will ring hollow if we're attacked again and if we haven't done everything reasonably necessary to prevent that attack, protect against that attack or respond to the consequences.

"That doesn't mean absolute security at the cost of everything, but it does mean a clear-eyed and a hard-thinking look at what the trade-offs ought to be to manage the risk, and a willingness to spend the money that's necessary to give us a reasonable assurance against a risk that if it comes to pass might have catastrophic consequences," stated Chertoff.

But not all believe that the new airport security measures are worth it.

In a recently-released report, some researchers argue that there is no solid evidence that the huge amounts of money spent on airport security screening measures since September 11th are effective.

Most screening program around the world are closely evaluated and heavily regulated before implementation. They rely on sound scientific and cost-benefit evidence before they are put into practice. Is airport security screening an exception, ask Eleni Linos and colleagues?

They reviewed evidence for the effectiveness of airport security screening measures, comparing it to the evidence required by the UK National Screening Committee criteria to justify medical screening programs.

Despite worldwide airport protection costing an estimated $5.6 billion every year, they found no comprehensive studies evaluating the effectiveness of passenger or hand luggage x-ray screening, metal detectors or explosive detection devices. There was also no clear evidence of testing accuracy.

The US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) defends its measures by reporting that more than 13 million prohibited items were intercepted in one year. But, argue the researchers, there is no way of knowing what proportion of these items would have led to serious harm.

This raises several questions, they say, such as what is the sensitivity of the screening question: 'Did you pack all your bags yourself?' and has anyone ever said 'no'? What are the ethical implications of pre-selecting high risk groups? Are new technologies that 'see' through clothes acceptable and what hazards should we screen for?

While there may be other benefits to rigorous airport screening, the absence of publicly available evidence to satisfy even the most basic criteria of a good screening program concerns them.

They call for airport security screening to be open to public and academic debate.

Rigorously evaluating the current system is only the first step for building a future airport security program that is more user-friendly, cost-effective and, ultimately, protects passengers from realistic threats, they have concluded.