National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt used a recent Board hearing on a Shuttle America runway overrun to raise questions regarding the regional airline industry's overall commitment to air safety. The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the Feb. 18, 2007...
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt used a recent Board hearing on a Shuttle America runway overrun to raise questions regarding the regional airline industry's overall commitment to air safety.
The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the Feb. 18, 2007 Shuttle America Embraer ERJ- 170 accident (Delta Connection Flight 6448) at Cleveland-Hopkins International was the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable during snowy conditions.
"Professional pilots have the daunting task of operating these passenger aircraft on a daily basis under a variety of weather conditions," says NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "Their decision making process and training must be comprehensive enough to take all conditions into account."
Contributing to the accident was the crew's decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude. Because the flight crewmembers were advised that the glideslope was unusable, they should not have executed the approach to ILS minimums; instead, they should have set up, briefed, and accomplished the approach to localizer (glideslope out) minimums.
Also contributing to the accident was the first officer's long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew's failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness. When the first officer lost sight of the runway just before landing, he should have abandoned the landing attempt and immediately executed a missed approach.
Furthermore, the NTSB said that had the flight crew used the reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness, the airplane would likely have stopped before the end of the runway.
The Board concluded that specific training for pilots in applying maximum braking and maximum reverse thrust on contaminated runways until a safe stop is ensured would reinforce the skills needed to successfully accomplish such landings.
In its final report on the accident investigation, the Safety Board noted that the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing, contributed to the accident.
By not advising Shuttle America of this fatigue or removing himself from duty, the captain placed himself, his crew, and his passengers in a dangerous situation that could have been avoided, the Board reasoned.
Another contributing factor to the accident, the Safety Board said, was Shuttle America's failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals.
The NTSB believes the policy had limited effectiveness because the specific details of the policy were not documented in writing and were not clearly communicated to pilots, especially the administrative implications or consequences of calling in as fatigued.
Sumwalt noted that industry safety data shows that between 1997-2006 runway overruns were the fourth largest cause of aircraft fatalities worldwide resulting in 262 fatalities.
The former airline pilot said the regional airline industry has grown to the point that regionals now carry about 20 percent of the overall passenger load and operate about half of the total number of air carrier operations and needs to at least match the major carriers in air safety.
"I want to see if there is a disparity between the levels of safety for regional air carriers and the major airlines...When a family gets on an aircraft at a small town for their annual pilgrimage to Disney World, they more than likely will get on a regional aircraft. I want to make sure that there is at least equivalent or higher levels of safety when they get on that regional aircraft," said Sumwalt at the NTSB hearing.
He said 'safety' includes a combination of factors that taken together help drive down the accident rate. Sumwalt praised how data collection programs, such as the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program, help to identify problems because they result in air crashes.
A survey of 14 major airlines and 21 regional carriers shows that 93 percent of the long haul carriers and 91 percent of the regionals conduct ASAP, which Sumwalt says is "good news."
But only one of the 21 regional airlines, or five percent of those surveyed, conduct FOQA programs. This compares to 86 percent of the long hauls surveyed. "This is not in the spirit of what the Safety Board would like to see. I am disappointed and concerned that the regional carriers have not done more to implement FOQA," he stated.
Over the last five years, there have been four fatal U.S. regional airline accidents resulting in 85 deaths. During the same period, there was one major airline fatal accident, resulting in one fatality. Sumwalt asked why there is a disparity between the two segments of the industry.
But in pointing out the disparity, the Safety Board vice chairman said his interest "is to motivate the regional airline industry to continue the progress that has raised the safety bar for all of us."
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