Grounded too late? In August 2001, FAA inspectors found more than 100 "apparent" violations and ordered Emery Worldwide Airlines to cease operations. Yet there are some who believe the FAA was not sufficiently aggressive in dealing with the regulatory evasions at Emery. Family members of pilots killed in the Emery crash (on February 16, 2000 near Sacramento, California) asserted in a May 14, 2002 letter to every member of Congress that FAA oversight was lacking.

Donald Land, father of copilot George Land on Emery Flight 17, charged that the FAA awarded airworthiness certificates to unqualified people and companies, and to Emery Worldwide Airlines in particular.

Even while under special FAA scrutiny, the airline "was still ignoring maintenance and line-safety issues by allowing continued operation of non-airworthy aircraft," Land said. "It is time to stop the killings," he pleaded.

In the National Transportation Safety Board’s findings in the crash of Emery Flight 17, short-comings in oversight were not mentioned. Nor was any FAA laxity mentioned in the probable cause. In two previous cases, the NTSB specifically cited shortcomings in FAA oversight as contributing factors.

NTSB chairman Ellen Engleman said the tragedy of Emery Flight 17 "illustrates the interdependence and critical roles and responsibilities of each member of the aviation safety chain.

"Safety requires 100 percent performance by everyone," she said. "Everyone" includes, by implication, the FAA.

An industry source suggested an unofficial "nonaggression pact" presently exists between the NTSB and the FAA. Besides, the Department of Transportation/Inspector General (DOT/IG) already has roundly criticized FAA oversight of contract maintenance. The NTSB has little to gain by adding to the DOT/IG’s sweeping findings. (See Aviation Maintenance, August 2003, page 13.)

The NTSB’s technical focus in the Emery case appears to be part of a larger theme. It might be called the quest for reliable redundancy. In the aftermath of fatal crashes and incidents involving the B737 rudder, the safety board called for the retrofit of a "reliably redundant" rudder control system� The safety board urged a similar approach to the pitch trim system on Douglas-designed twinjets and their derivatives after the Alaska Flight 261 crash.

Now, in the Emery case, while the words "reliably redundant" do not appear specifically, that standard is the desired end-point in the redesign and retrofit of the control tab installations the board has called for on DC-8 aircraft.