The Sporty Game

I read with interest your editorial in the May 2005 issue (The Sporty Game, Circa 2005, page 3). I've been wrestling with the notion of which concept will gain favor in the airline industry:

• Large, high-capacity aircraft like the Airbus A380 flying lots of passengers to major hubs then using smaller commuter-style aircraft to transport them to their final destination.
• Boeing 787-type aircraft providing non-stop, point-to-point service.

Granted, Southwest Airlines made the latter work very well for itself but that explains only part of the company's success story. I believe Southwest's exclusive use of a single airframe (i.e. 737-xxx) contributes greatly to minimizing expenses and to the resulting profits. In my opinion, fuel prices, a dwindling maintenance workforce, consolidation, and simpler logistics of a smaller fleet of larger aircraft feeding major hubs may prove to, ultimately, be the trend. The preference of the passenger to fly non-stop may give way to higher corporate profitability. I see evidence of that in other markets where maintaining the highest levels of customer service takes a back seat to how much it costs to provide that level of satisfaction. Consider, again, Southwest and its "first-come, first-serve" boarding policy. How many times have you flown on the airline and witnessed other passengers sitting/sleeping on the floor at the gate for over an hour to make sure they get a decent seat in the aisle, window, or front of the airplane? It goes to show what the consumer is willing to endure for a direct flight or a cheaper fare. Air travel is no longer a luxury, but a commodity. The airlines will provide it only while it remains profitable and the flying public will have no choice but to adapt accordingly.

Name withheld by request

Roll Those Heads!

The Saga of Papa Whiskey (April 2005, page 20) painfully illustrates the current misguided and dangerous no-fault philosophy. No one is ever at fault. We all must learn from our carelessness. Let's hope it doesn't happen again and let's all make up.

Rubbish. There was nothing learned from the Papa Whiskey saga except Lufthansa Technik blatantly ignored basic maintenance. In other words they were sloppy!

First of all, that bent pin came about because someone forced the connectors together and didn't bother to check when they must have felt some resistance.

Furthermore everything they did to fix it was sloppy. When they got to the out-of-sequence color code, that was an obvious question mark, and not conducting a continuity and complete control (both) check plus flight check was irresponsible.

The only thing that was "learned" from this near disaster was that Lufthansa Technik mechanics ignored the basics and for that heads should have rolled!

Karl Kettler

Flemington, New Jersey

Sorry, but I can't agree with your assessment. Lufthansa and Lufthansa Technik deserve a lot of credit for using the Papa Whiskey incident as a learning opportunity, figuring out what went wrong, and not only developing procedures to prevent it from happening again but also changing the corporate culture to make such an incident unlikely to recur.

The out-of-sequence color code on the actual connector was highly confusing and non-intuitive, not to mention the confusing service bulletin applicability. As for the control check, we don't know if the control check was done with the pilot's or first officer's control stick. If it was done with the first officer's stick, then all checks would be normal. We also don't know if the pilots observed the movement of the ailerons during their pre-takeoff check. Can you even see the ailerons from an A320 cockpit?

We hope that anyone reading this can learn from what happened to Papa Whiskey and hopefully use that knowledge to prevent their own Papa Whiskeys from occurring. -- Matt Thurber, Editor

What Were They Thinking?

I read the article by Joy Finnegan, Bombardier Finding the right Formula For Customer Service (May, page 20). I was surprised by some of the content of the article. Especially Dave Orcutt's comment, "with a fleet of 3,200 aircraft flying daily, we have our share of issues, six to eight aircraft AOG a day, currently the company is actively recruiting technicians, and has hired more than 100 over the last year." Troy Jonas decided to close the Bombardier Indianapolis maintenance facility that employed about 75 mechanics less than a year ago. I would be curious to hear Dave and Troy's comments on how that helped the 3,200 Bombardier aircraft and customers. Later in the article Troy Jonas talks about the three additional facilities recently opened but no explanation of why Bombardier closed the Indianapolis facility in the same timeframe?

Closing the Bombardier Indianapolis service center would be understandable if they were not making a profit, but the facility profited by over $2 million in 2003. The quarter before the decision was made to close the facility, they celebrated the most manhours sold in one quarter in Indianapolis. The mechanics were working on aircraft outside of the hangar because of the volume of aircraft in the hangars. The day Troy Jonas was at the facility to announce the closing, aircraft were on the ramp waiting for available hangar space and technicians to work on them.

Fortunately for the customers of these aircraft affected, the day after the Bombardier Indianapolis service center closed another facility opened with the same technicians in the same hangar.

Dan Novreske

Indianapolis, Indiana

Outsourcing Qualms

I have spoken with a federal representative concerning the outsourcing of high-tech aircraft jobs, and what I have now learned about illegal aliens working on American flag aircraft here and abroad is outrageous. Your organization and others should be putting a stop to this, instead of what is now being perceived by the public as not being informed about the issue of safety.

If you have a United States FAA certificate (i.e., A & P or the worthless repairman certificate) these third-world countries can hire mechanics from the U.S. to go and sign off the airworthiness of American carriers' aircraft. But in Canada, Germany, Britain, etc., they do not recognize the FAA certificate, to have an American FAA technician sign off the work done on airplanes in their country. The certificate is not recognized as being valid for those countries mentioned, because of the requirements set forth by their respective civil aviation authority except for Hong Kong and Singapore. What this means is that I can go to Hong Kong or Singapore and use my certificate in those countries because they are recognized, but not in Germany, England, or Canada.

Because of their system of integrity, you have to be licensed to work on a particular aircraft and meet the requirements to work on that aircraft after you pass a test. The same is not true in this country. So this lets non-qualified non-licensed individuals that have not been trained work on the American carriers' aircraft in countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and Brazil, as long as they have on staff a certificated FAA A&P willing to sign off the shoddy work as being airworthy.

When the industry tries to distance themselves on this issue, I think that they are going to be in for a rude awakening. There are some in Congress who want to really look at this issue in the context of what it means for safety. They may consider rules about verification of training and qualification of personnel similar to the rules in countries like Canada, Britain, and Germany. The airlines are going to fight the new rules, but enough is enough. No more crying wolf and blaming the worker about the wages, respect, benefits, and other issues that are used to justify these illegal actions by all in this industry. Remember this: Qantas has never had an accident. All of their technicians are qualified to work on a particular aircraft, by training, and they are not allowing others to work on their aircraft.

Name Withheld by Request